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JUSTICE BEGINS BEFORE TRIAL: HOW TO NUDGE
INACCURATE PRETRIAL RULINGS USING BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL LAWS

MICHAEL GENTITHES*
ABSTRACT
Injustice in criminal cases often takes root before trial begins.
Overworked criminal judges must resolve difficult pretrial evidentiary issues that determine the charges the State will take to trial and
the range of sentences the defendant will face. Wrong decisions on
these issues often lead to wrongful convictions. As behavioral law
and economic theory suggests, judges who are cognitively busy and
receive little feedback on these topics from appellate courts rely upon
intuition, rather than deliberative reasoning, to resolve these questions. This leads to inconsistent rulings, which prosecutors exploit to
expand the scope of evidentiary exceptions that almost always
disfavor defendants. Such intuitive, inconsistent decision-making
thereby undermines criminal justice before trial even starts.
In this Article, I argue that criminal judges can rely on an
alternative model to decide an especially vexing pretrial evidentiary
issue—the admissibility of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement at
the defendant’s trial. Judges can look to principles in uniform commercial laws to resolve this issue in a more deliberative fashion.
Uniform commercial laws predictably, accurately, and simply allocate individual liability for the actions of opaque, profit-driven commercial organizations. Those laws can likewise allocate individual
liability among members of analogous conspiratorial organizations.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am extremely grateful for
the helpful comments of Christopher Schmidt, Nancy Marder, Kimberly Bailey, Scott
Skinner-Thompson, Anthony Michael Kreis, Harold Krent, Mark Rosen, Jonathan Brown,
Hayes Holderness, Doug Godfrey, Kent Streseman, and Cody Jacobs.
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Because those laws are also reducible to decision trees and checklists
that encourage deliberative reasoning while still generating relatively
fast decisions, judges can rely upon them to produce fair results
without bringing their dockets to a standstill.
I provide several examples of situations in which illicit organizations are sufficiently analogous to commercial organizations for
judges to apply uniform commercial laws when resolving coconspirator hearsay issues. When judges do so, they will check the
growth of anti-defendant evidentiary exceptions. Critically, they will
also increase the likelihood of just outcomes in criminal cases once
the trial begins.
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INTRODUCTION
Andy, Brian, and Devin, longtime cops in the outwardly sleepy
town of Anytown, decided to spice things up on routine drug busts.
They started small, taking home a dime-bag of marijuana here, selling a few seized pills of ecstasy there. But things changed when a
raid led them to arrest Isaac, Devin’s old high school football teammate and a major player in Anytown’s nascent drug scene. Devin
convinced Isaac that he would cut his old friend a break if Isaac
would do him just one favor: act as a fence and resell seized drugs
for the fledgling criminal enterprise.
Isaac began funneling a growing pipeline of drugs into the black
market. Profits grew as Isaac brought heaps of recycled contraband
onto Anytown’s streets. But trouble loomed. Isaac was picked up on
another case that could put him away for years, this time while
driving in a nearby county with an unlicensed gun. Unless, the
friendly arresting officer suggested, Isaac had information on
Anytown’s burgeoning drug trade.
Isaac quickly flipped against the corrupt officers and began
wearing a wire to their meetings. The case against Andy and Brian
solidified; on the wire, they boasted about their drug heists and the
prices they hoped Isaac could fetch on resale. But for some reason,
Devin stopped attending the meetings. He even texted Isaac to say
they might not see each other for a while. When Isaac asked the
others about Devin, they insisted he was just overloaded with
“official duties” from their pig-headed Chief.
On the next delivery to Isaac, an ambitious prosecutor decided to
spring the trap against the crooked cops. The prosecutor caught
Andy and Brian red-handed with seized drugs that never made it to
the evidence locker. The two quickly accepted plea deals, but they
refused to implicate Devin. In fact, both said Devin was too undisciplined to be invited into their scheme, claiming they only told
Isaac that his good friend Devin was involved to gain Isaac’s trust.
The prosecutor, determined not to let Devin walk, sought to admit
Andy’s and Brian’s recorded conversations against Devin. She argued that the three cops were longtime co-conspirators, and the
recorded conversations were made “during the course of” and “in
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furtherance of” that conspiracy. They were thus admissible against
Devin under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.1
This problem illustrates a quagmire criminal judges often face:
When are an alleged co-conspirator’s statements admissible at a
defendant’s trial? If the co-conspirator refuses to testify, then his
conversations with others are hearsay—unless, under Federal Rule
of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(2)(E) and its state analogues, those conversations were made “during and in furtherance of th[at] conspiracy.”2 That vague language is difficult to apply in muddled fact
patterns, such as cases in which statements were made after the
defendant was expressly disavowed from the conspiracy.3
Co-conspirator hearsay issues are one type of many vexing
pretrial evidentiary decisions that have dramatic effects on the
outcome of a criminal case.4 Those rulings often dictate which
charges the State will pursue. In the vast majority of cases, those
rulings establish a baseline for plea bargains that resolve the litigation.5 For those cases that go to a jury, pretrial evidentiary
rulings control the narrative jurors will construct from the evidence,
determining the course of litigation and the range of counts upon
which the jury will deliberate.6
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
2. Id. The FRE’s categorical approach to hearsay aims to promote efficient analysis. See,
e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay: Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1861,
1882-83, 1893-94 (2015). However, the co-conspirator exception is one area where it falls considerably short.
3. In Part IV, I discuss additional co-conspirator hearsay problems that often arise, using
variations upon the facts in the Introduction to illustrate them.
4. See, e.g., Kara MacKillop & Neil Vidmar, Decision-Making in the Dark: How Pre-Trial
Errors Change the Narrative in Criminal Jury Trials, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 958 (2015)
(“[E]stablished evidentiary doctrines are sometimes compelling incorrect verdicts by presenting the juries with incomplete and inaccurate evidence while expecting them to develop
complete and accurate narratives.”).
5. See Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants,
Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 538-39 (2007). See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 24 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW6K-K8QH] [hereinafter FELONY DEFENDANTS]. According to
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in the seventy-five largest counties in the U.S. during the
year 2006, “[a]bout two-thirds of felony defendants were eventually convicted and more than
95% of these convictions occurred through a guilty plea.” Criminal Cases, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
BUREAU JUSTISE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=23 [https://perma.cc/
A7WR-AUNG].
6. MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 962-63 (citing NAT’L REGISTRY OF
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Behavioral law and economic theory accurately predict that such
pretrial evidentiary rulings are a cognitive minefield where intuitive
“System 1” thinking predominates over deliberative “System 2”
reasoning.7 Criminal judges have punishingly crowded dockets that
overburden their cognitive capacities.8 They also receive precious
little guidance on these discretionary issues from higher courts.9 Yet
EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE UNIV. OF MICH . LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/ exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx?View={B8342AE7-6520-4A32-8A06-4B326208
BAF8}&FilterField1=Contributing_x0020_ Factors_x0020&FilterValue1=False%20or%20
Misleading%20Forensic%20Evidence [https://perma.cc./EEJ3-PPSG]) (noting the frequency
with which erroneous pretrial evidentiary rulings can lead to convictions of defendants who
are later proven innocent in post-conviction proceedings).
Admissibility issues are generally dealt with prior to trial, with motions
presented and judicial decisions rendered outside of the jury’s presence. Of
course, the results of these motions, right or wrong, will alter the narrative
developed by a jury, whatever the righteous or devious intentions of counsel and
the judge. Furthermore, because these issues are typically addressed and
dismissed on direct appeal (... typically under the harmless error doctrine), they
are not available as strong arguments in innocence petitions unless the
cumulative effect of these errors can show a due process violation.
Id. at 974.
7. I discuss these terms in more detail below in Part II.B. See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN ,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20-21 (2011).
Some environments are inherently better for experts to develop accurate guiding intuitions
than other environments.
If the environment is sufficiently regular and if the judge has had a chance to
learn its regularities, the associative machinery will recognize situations and
generate quick and accurate predictions and decisions. You can trust someone’s
intuitions if these conditions are met....
....
[But i]n a less regular, or low-validity, environment, the heuristics of judgment are invoked. [Intuition] is often able to produce quick answers to difficult
questions by substitution, creating coherence where there is none.
Id. at 243; see also Robin M. Hogarth et al., The Two Settings of Kind and Wicked Learning
Environments, 24 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 379, 379-82 (2015).
8. In just the month of May 2009, “[a]bout 56,000 felony cases were filed in the 75 largest
counties” in America. FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 5, at 2.
9. See MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 969 (“[T]he appeals courts have historically
rubber-stamped the decisions of trial courts in these areas ... utilizing the harmless error
doctrine.”); Uphoff, supra note 5, at 539 (“[A]ppellate courts rarely overturn convictions based
on erroneous evidentiary rulings.” (citing Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary
Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894-96 (1992))); see also Chris
Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV . 1, 32
(2007).
For example, the United States Supreme Court has avoided directly addressing the
admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay statements. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 176 n.1 (1987) (“[The Court] do[es] not express an opinion on the proper order of proof
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they must somehow quickly and accurately resolve questions like
the co-conspirator hearsay problem above to avoid interminable
delays in the cases they handle.
Busy criminal judges faced with these difficult pretrial evidentiary issues tend to rely on intuitive judgments, rather than on deliberative reasoning, to reach rapid rulings.10 Judgments based upon
intuitive heuristics are subject to a plethora of cognitive biases that
undermine their reliability.11 For instance, a judge might rely too
much on hindsight to conclude erroneously that the harm a conspiracy would work upon victims was inevitable.12 Therefore, the
judge finds that a defendant’s participation in that conspiracy’s
early activities renders him liable for everything that co-conspira-

that trial courts should follow in concluding that the preponderance standard has been
satisfied in an ongoing trial.”). Furthermore, appellate courts are commonly unwilling to
reverse on these difficult evidentiary issues, relying instead on the “harmless error” doctrine
to uphold the lower court’s decision when the defendant was convicted. See MacKillop &
Vidmar, supra note 4, at 969, 974, 979.
The lack of such guidance leads judges to over-rely on intuitive reactions at the expense of
more deliberate thinking about the issue. See KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 241 (“Whether
professionals have a chance to develop intuitive expertise depends essentially on the quality
and speed of feedback, as well as on sufficient opportunity to practice.”); see also Guthrie et
al., supra, at 35.
10. Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 35 (“Judges facing cognitive overload due to heavy
dockets or other on-the-job constraints are more likely to make intuitive rather than deliberative decisions because the former are speedier and easier. Furthermore, being cognitively
‘busy’ induces judges to rely on intuitive judgment.” (footnotes omitted)).
11. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001)
(“Psychologists have learned that human beings rely on mental shortcuts, which psychologists
often refer to as ‘heuristics,’ to make complex decisions. Reliance on these heuristics facilitates
good judgment most of the time, but it can also produce systematic errors in judgment.”
(footnotes omitted)). Judges are subject to the same flawed thinking. Id. at 784 (“[U]nder
certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous
judgments.”); see also Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 13-29. For that reason, Guthrie and his
co-authors suggest that “deliberative decision making is more likely than intuitive decision
making to lead to just outcomes.” Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 6. The need to avoid intuitive
judging is especially acute on discretionary issues where trial judges typically receive little
feedback or guidance from higher courts. Id. at 33 (“[J]udges should use deliberation as a
verification mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable either
because feedback is absent or because judges face cues likely to induce misleading reliance
on heuristics.”).
12. This kind of reasoning, known as “hindsight bias,” is based on the mistaken intuition
that the actual outcome of events was predictable or even inevitable ex ante. Guthrie et al.,
supra note 9, at 24.
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tors later did or said, irrespective of his withdrawal or excommunication.13
Overreliance on intuition generates inconsistencies in judges’
decisions on issues like the co-conspirator hearsay exception.14
Enterprising prosecutors have capitalized on those inconsistencies
to expand the scope of such evidentiary exceptions.15 Thus, although
13. See id. at 25-26.
14. As I discuss in more detail in below, examples of inconsistent application of the coconspirator exception to hearsay abound in court rulings. See infra Part II.C. For instance,
courts have often conflicted when determining the admissibility of statements made after a
conspiracy has achieved its primary objective, but while the co-conspirators remain intent
upon concealing the conspiracy’s existence. Compare United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp.
2d 928, 959-60 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (holding statements made to induce another to falsely confess
to the murder of several witnesses to her conspiracy with the defendant were inadmissible),
and United States v. Gonzalez, 610 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D.P.R. 1985) (“[O]nce the central
criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may
not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a
secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection
and punishment.”), with United States v. Trent, 306 F. App’x 482, 484-86 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (affirming the admission of co-defendant’s statement regarding the filing of false tax
returns and submission of false statements in 2006 to conceal a conspiracy to defraud a local
housing authority years earlier in 2003), and United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 888
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (holding the conspiracy to illegally dispose of hazardous waste “would
necessarily entail a conspiracy to ensure that the true nature of the acts would not be
uncovered,” so statements made in the effort to conceal those acts were admissible as made
in furtherance of the conspiracy).
Another area of discord concerns statements made before the defendant actually entered
the conspiracy. Compare United States v. Carter, 966 F. Supp. 336, 346-47 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding statements co-conspirator made to undercover agent about potential conspiracy to
launder money using the defendant’s business, before the defendant agreed to join, were
admissible at defendant’s trial), and United States v. Brown, 755 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo.
1991) (holding that because overarching conspiracy had multiple criminal objects which
required some participants to leave and join it during its lifetime, statements co-conspirators
made before the defendant joined were admissible at his trial), with United States v. Hill, 279
F. App’x 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (excluding evidence that months before the defendant participated in a conspiracy to rob the victim, his co-defendants participated in a similar robbery),
and United States v. Davis, 67 F. App’x 771, 775-76 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding
statements made by a co-defendant in a drug conspiracy were inadmissible at trial where
those statements were made years before the charged conspiracy).
15. As an example, a 2010 study of the use of the co-conspirator hearsay exception in just
eight of the federal circuits since the exception was adopted in 1975 found some 2500 cases
where prosecutors relied upon the exception. Ben Trachtenberg, Coconspirators,
“Coventurers,” and the Exception Swallowing the Hearsay Rule, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 623
(2010). Some federal prosecutors have begun to argue “a revised definition of the Exception
itself, arguing that the ‘conspiracy’ joined by the defendant and declarant need not ‘have as
its object an unlawful purpose.’” Id. at 612. Such expansions of the co-conspirator exception
to hearsay typically disfavor defendants. See id. at 626-27.
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intuitive evidentiary rulings expedite criminal dockets and preserve
judges’ analytical capacities, they carry unacceptable costs for criminal justice.
I offer an alternative decision-making path for criminal judges
that will restore much-needed consistency to their pretrial rulings,
at least in the area of co-conspirator hearsay. By turning to principles contained in uniform commercial laws, criminal judges can
fashion normatively sound decision-making models to resolve coconspirator hearsay questions without bringing the machinery of
the criminal justice system to a stand still.16 Multi-factor scripts and
checklists can disrupt judges’ unexamined reliance upon intuition
and encourage deliberative thinking on especially difficult questions.17 They can guide judges to ask the right questions about a
case, leaving room for individual judgment once their deliberative
faculties are triggered.18 By relying on the multi-factored, rule-based
thinking required to analyze problems under uniform commercial
laws, judges can reduce their dependence on intuitive heuristics
with questionable normative bases,19 yet still find consistent answers relatively quickly.20 In turn, judges can check the growth of
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 40 (“Scripts and checklists can free judges from
reliance on their memories and encourage them to proceed methodically, thereby ensuring
that they touch all of the deliberative bases. A judge who must review a script or checklist at
each step in the decision-making process is less likely to rely on intuition when doing so is
inadvisable.”); see also KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 65 (“Cognitive strain, whatever its source,
mobilizes System 2, which is more likely to reject the intuitive answer suggested by System
1.”).
18. Such checklists can “provide reminders of only the most critical and important steps,”
allowing even “experts,” like judges, to “remember how to manage a complex
process”—applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ATUL GAWANDE, THE
CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 120 (2010).
19. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 41 (“Multifactor tests can help ensure that judges
consider all relevant factors and can remind them of their responsibility to base decisions on
more than mere intuition. Similar reminder systems have reduced medical diagnostic error.
Thus, a system that forces judges to weigh each of the factors expressly also might help reduce
judges’ reliance on intuition.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Paul R. Dexter et al., A
Computerized Reminder System to Increase the Use of Preventive Care for Hospitalized
Patients, 345 NEW ENG . J. MED . 965, 965 (2001). “The legal system might also adopt
procedural, evidentiary, and even substantive rules to minimize the deleterious effects of
cognitive illusions on judicial decision making. By adopting such rules, the system can avoid
placing judges in a position in which cognitive illusions are likely to lead them astray.”
Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 828.
20. As an example of the utility of checklists in another professional discipline, in a study
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evidentiary exceptions that largely favor prosecutors and preserve
the judges’ intellectual capital for the ultimate issues of guilt or innocence in the case.21
Uniform commercial laws are ripe for application to co-conspirator hearsay questions. Conspiratorial agreements are surprisingly
similar to existing commercial arrangements subject to those uniform laws.22 The authors of those laws sought to enhance the predictability of arms-length economic transactions in part by ensuring
that the proper parties within an amorphous, opaque, profit-driven
commercial organization are liable for that organization’s actions.23
Similarly, judges can apply uniform commercial law in the criminal
context to ensure that the proper party in an amorphous, opaque,
profit-driven conspiracy is criminally liable for the illicit activities
the conspiracy undertakes.24 Furthermore, judges can apply those
laws through decision trees and checklists that reduce reliance upon
intuition in favor of more accurate, deliberative thinking.25 Because
conspiratorial arrangements may reflect new ideas in the organizational structure of a profit-motivated organization, the application

requiring eight hospitals around the world to utilize a carefully designed surgical safety
checklist, “the rate of major complications for surgical patients in all eight hospitals fell by
36 percent after introduction of the checklist. Deaths fell 47 percent.” GAWANDE, supra note
18, at 154.
21. Though a ruling on the co-conspirator exception may be outcome determinative for one
or more of the State’s charges, numerous others often remain standing. At trial on those
remaining counts, the trier of fact—often the court itself if the defendant elects a bench
trial—must determine whether the State has proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Efficient evidentiary rulings allow the court to allocate intellectual capital to the
guilt-innocence phase of trial, rather than consuming it in pretrial evidentiary matters. This
argument also favors the FRE’s categorical hearsay approach. See, e.g., Richter, supra note
2, at 1893-94.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997) (allocating
partnership liability where a partner’s transaction exceeds his actual authority); id. §§ 702,
704, 801 (allocating partnership liability following the dissociation of a partner); U.C.C. § 4205 (AM . LAW INST. 2017) (introducing warranty provisions to allocated liabilities in the event
of forged indorsements on an instrument); id. § 3-405 (allocating losses from fraudulent
indorsements made by an employee between the drawer employer, the drawee bank, and the
depository bank); see also infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 40. As I discuss in more detail below, commercial
subjects are often amenable to checklists from which answers can be quickly derived. See
infra Part III.
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of uniform bodies of commercial law to those conspiratorial arrangements can also aid the development of commercial legal theory.26
When conspiratorial arrangements are sufficiently analogous to
commercial arrangements, criminal judges should apply those uniform commercial laws to resolve co-conspirator hearsay issues.27 As
an example, both the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provide ready answers to the
hypothetical scenario outlined at the beginning of this Introduction.
As detailed further below,28 RUPA section 703’s rule on the liability
of a dissociated partner and UCC section 3-403’s treatment of the
effect of an unauthorized signature each counsel against admitting
Andy’s and Brian’s statements in Devin’s trial.29
I begin the Article with a discussion of the history and mechanics
of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.30 Next, I discuss
how judges typically rely on intuitive judgments rather than on
deliberative reasoning to resolve questions under that rule, a dangerous precedent under the theories promulgated by the behavioral
law and economics movement.31 I then argue that uniform commercial law concepts can provide a needed decision-making model for
overworked criminal judges facing co-conspirator hearsay questions
while preserving neutrality in pretrial evidentiary rulings.32 Next,
I provide specific examples where the application of uniform commercial law principles can readily resolve what would otherwise be
vexing applications of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay

26. Doing so will help preserve the Dworkinian integrity of both commercial and criminal
jurisprudence. See RONALD DWORKIN , LAW ’S EMPIRE 89-90 (1986); see also Michael Gentithes,
Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 848-49 (2012) (discussing
Dworkin’s theory of integrity). This reflective process will allow commercial law to develop the
flexibility needed to address an economy of rapidly shifting organizations and intricately
balanced supply lines. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.B. Criminal courts that borrow from uniform commercial laws will
also be treating arrangements for the sale and distribution of commercial and illicit goods
identically, a requirement of formal justice. For a fuller discussion of theories of formal justice,
see Gentithes, supra note 26, at 845-47.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997); U.C.C. § 3-403 (AM .
LAW INST. 2017).
30. See infra Part I.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
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rule.33 Lastly, I consider some limitations and likely objections to my
position before concluding.34
I. THE HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR
EXCEPTION
Recorded statements such as those of crooked cops Andy and
Brian fit the traditional definition of hearsay; they are out-of-court
statements the prosecution uses to prove the facts asserted in them
about the crimes charged.35 Such statements are generally excluded
as unreliable evidence of the truth of the matters they assert.36 But
an evidentiary tradition offers the government a reprieve.37 Under
FRE 801(d)(2)(E) and its state analogues, a co-conspirator’s
statement made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not
hearsay.38 This workaround to the hearsay rule has its roots in
common law and was generally approved by the United States
Supreme Court as early as 1827.39
Many justifications for the exception have emerged over time.40
One is that co-conspirators, like partners or agents, are legally
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part V.
35. For a broad review of the history of the hearsay rule in general, see Trachtenberg,
supra note 15, at 587-95.
36. See FED . R. EVID . 801, 802.
37. FED. R. EVID. 802.
38. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
39. See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469-70 (1827). For a more
detailed discussion of the Gooding case, see Michael L. Seigel & Daniel Weisman, The
Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
877, 883-84 (2007).
40. Professor Trachtenberg provides a helpful summary of some of these justifications:
The leading arguments put forth to support the Exception are (1) an analogy to
agency law and the principal-agent exception to the Rule, wherein each
conspirator is said to adopt his confederates as his agents; (2) the proposition
that statements within the Exception are not hearsay at all because they constitute verbal acts; (3) the argument that, like other categories of hearsay for which
exceptions exist, coconspirator statements are generally reliable and so ought
not be barred by the Rule; and (4) the practical position that absent the
Exception, necessary prosecutions of many crimes—ranging from treason to
drug distribution—would be impossible, or at least severely impeded.
Trachtenberg, supra note 15, at 627 (citing David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and
the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV . L.
REV. 1378, 1384 (1972)).
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responsible for the acts of all other parties to their agreed-upon
enterprise, including the statements of those other parties.41 As
Learned Hand observed, “[w]hen men enter into an agreement for
an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and
have made ‘a partnership in crime.’ What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts,
[those declarations] are competent against all.”42 A defendant who
makes an illicit agreement with a co-conspirator binds himself, by
the very nature of that agreement, to any statements the coconspirator makes.43 The co-conspirator speaks with the same voice
as the defendant, and thus the co-conspirator’s statements are admissible at trial as if they were the defendant’s own.44
Another justification for the exception is the position that coconspirator statements are often not hearsay at all. Instead, coconspirator statements are acts with legal repercussions.45 They can
establish the elements of a crime, be it conspiracy or another underlying offense.46 “More than a mere statement to [the defendant], the
law deems the words of [a co-conspirator] a criminal act, and it is
the act that the prosecutor means to show the jury.”47
Two additional justifications for the rule have emerged over time.
First, some argue that co-conspirator statements are inherently
reliable.48 The reliability allegedly arises from the unlikelihood
that a co-conspirator would falsely accuse himself of participating
in a criminal enterprise.49 Second, others claim that co-conspirator
41. See KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259 (7th ed. 2014).
42. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
43. This justification initially supported the exception in early America. See Trachtenberg,
supra note 15, at 599-600 (quoting 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 402 (Phila., P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 3d American ed. 1830); 1 S. MARCH
PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 199-200 (N.Y., Banks, Gould & Co. 3d ed.
1849)).
44. The drafters of the FRE expressed skepticism about this theory of conspiracy, noting
in the Advisory Committee Notes that “the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and
ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already established.” FED . R. EVID .
801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note.
45. See Trachtenberg, supra note 15, at 598.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 631-34.
49. See id. at 631. But often these statements prove inherently unreliable, especially in
describing the aims or membership of the conspiracy. See id. at 632 (quoting Joseph H. Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators’ Exception to the Hearsay
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statements are a necessity in many criminal prosecutions.50 The
necessity argument posits that many crimes committed by clandestine organizations could not be prosecuted at all if such statements
were inadmissible.51
To qualify a co-conspirator’s statement as nonhearsay under the
exception, the prosecution must meet a few seemingly simple requirements. It must first provide prima facie evidence of the existence of that conspiracy.52 Though it may rely on the statements
themselves, they “do[ ] not by [themselves] establish ... the existence
of the conspiracy or [the declarant’s] participation in it.”53
Once the government makes that prima facie showing, the coconspirator’s statement is admissible if it was made “during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.”54 Although those requirements seem
straightforward, they are difficult to apply in complex factual
scenarios. Co-conspirators often will not reduce agreements to writing, forcing courts to parse the language the co-conspirators use to
determine if a statement was made “during and in furtherance of”
that conspiracy.55 As I discuss in more detail below, criminal judges’
approaches to the ambiguous statements typical in multipledefendant prosecutions have varied widely, making this area of law
unpredictable.56
II. INTUITION AND PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
In this Part, I argue that overworked criminal judges too often
rely on intuitive cognitive processes, rather than on their deliberative faculties, to resolve pretrial evidentiary issues such as the
Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1954)).
50. See id. at 633-34.
51. See id. However, this does not explain why co-conspirator statements ought to be
considered reliable in favor of a prosecution.
52. See Norman M. Garland & Donald E. Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exception to the
Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J.
CRIM . L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 1, 8 (1972).
53. FED. R. EVID . 801(d)(2). Though outside the scope of this Article, a significant body of
research addresses what constitutes a sufficient prima facie showing to trigger the coconspirator exception. See, e.g., Garland & Snow, supra note 52.
54. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
55. See id.
56. See infra Part II.C.
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co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. By doing so, judges
generate inconsistent rulings that expand evidentiary rules, usually
to defendants’ disadvantage.57 Such inconsistent rulings undermine
justice in criminal courtrooms throughout the country.
A. Criminal Judges’ Heavy Dockets
Criminal judges are incredibly overworked. State court processing
statistics gathered by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice
Statistics demonstrate an alarming upward trend in criminal court
workloads.58 For example, in Cook County, Illinois,59 which encompasses Chicago and is home to the second largest unified court
system in America,60 “31,106 felony cases were filed ... [i]n 2009 ...
which equates to about 598 felony cases filed per week.”61 That
workload is divided among approximately 400 circuit court judges,62
with fewer than 50 judges assigned full time to adjudicating the
most serious criminal offenses.63 Cook County is not alone in the
pace or volume of criminal cases it assigns to overcrowded dockets.64
In May 2009, “[a]bout 56,000 felony cases were filed in the 75 largest counties” in America.65 That staggering workload has a predictable effect on the efficiency with which trial courts can adjudicate
criminal cases. The median time from arrest to adjudication in

57. See Richter, supra note 2, at 1894.
58. See State Court Caseload Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=30 [https://perma.cc/JJ59-B4QL].
59. For the past several years, the author has served as an Assistant Appellate Defender
with the Office of the State Appellate Defender in the Illinois Appellate Court First District,
which encompasses Cook County.
60. Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW . U. L. REV. 1205, 1228 n.109 (2017).
61. FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 5, at 33.
62. Organization of the Circuit Court, CIR. CT. COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.
org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OrganizationoftheCircuitCourt.aspx [https://perma.cc/NAF5-9HWP].
63. Criminal Division Judges, CIR. CT. COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.
org/ABOUTTHECOURT/CountyDepartment/CriminalDivision/JudgesInformation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/N3WC-TRP4]. These judges hear cases where the State alleges the
commission of a serious criminal act, including but not limited to armed robbery, assault,
burglary, criminal sexual assault, and murder. County Department Overview, CIR. CT. COOK
COUNTY , http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/CountyDepartment.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LCQ9-NTEY].
64. See State Court Caseload Statistics, supra note 58.
65. FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 5, at 2.
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felony cases increased 29 percent in the two decades prior to 2009,
up to an average of 111 days.66
B. Judicial Reliance on Flawed Intuition
Presented with that oppressive workload, judges must expedite
their decision-making processes to make fast-paced rulings.67 They
are especially likely to turn to easily applied, intuitive heuristics to
resolve pretrial evidentiary issues.68 Evidentiary rules are saddled
with innumerable exceptions, making these issues appear straightforward while in practice they are “very subjective and prone to bias
influences.”69 When asked how they resolve difficult evidentiary
issues debated vigorously by opposing counsel, judges in major metropolitan areas made “frequent[ ] ... reference to the use of judicial
intuition. [Judges defined this as] ... a form of learned hunch,
developed through experience on the bench.”70 Many criminal judges
“show[ ] an unwillingness ... to wrestle with the difficult issues

66. Id. at 22.
67. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 35. Predictability is a key component in the
development of a coherent body of legal rules. For instance, F. A. Hayek emphasized the need
to establish a sphere of predictable freedoms and constraints within which actors could
organize their affairs to achieve their own aims. See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK , THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 142-43 (1960). For a thoughtful critique of the primacy of predictability in upholding
the rule of law, see Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach,
111 MICH . L. REV. 1, 9-14 (2012) (discussing the “right sort of predictability” in precedent
decisions).
68. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 35.
69. MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 968 (“Evidence admissibility ... is a more
complicated, nuanced area of law.”).
70. PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE URBAN
CRIMINAL COURTS 124 (1985). Such intuitions often betray favoritism towards the prosecution.
Id. at 20.
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presented and to come to their own determination of the issues.”71
Instead, rapid-fire, intuitive rulings are the norm.72
Such judicial intuition is generated by what psychology professor
Daniel Kahneman and others in the behavioral law and economics
movement call “System 1” mental processing.73 System 1 thinking
relies on spontaneous, almost automatic reactions to the facts of a
case, engaging analytical pathways that are less cognitively taxing
and require less than full attention.74 Such thinking is “automatic,
largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of computational
capacity,” thereby “conjoin[ing] properties of automaticity and heuristic processing.”75
Such intuitive thinking stands in contrast to more deliberative
“System 2” mental systems.76 System 2 is more attentive and effortful, and it is “often associated with the subjective experience of
agency, choice, and concentration.”77 Such thinking will “decontextualize and depersonalize problems”; it is thus “more adept at representing in terms of rules and underlying principles.”78 It relies on
concentration to apply those learned rules to a new question.79
These systems are often used after an initial intuitive reaction has
been generated, “which may correct impulsive, inappropriate
71. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 804
(1995). For that reason, “many judges routinely ... allow the lawyers for the state to write
their orders resolving disputed factual and legal issues,” even including “long and detailed
opinions, often over forty pages in length, containing extensive factual characterizations and
legal analysis.” Id. at 793, 803. “Such ghostwritten orders are not the impartial findings of
disinterested judges, but rather the briefs of advocates, containing one-sided, exaggerated
‘findings’ that prosecutors have tailored for strategic advantage on appeal and in postconviction review.” Id. at 803-04.
72. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 29.
73. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 7, at 20-21. For a useful, concise summary of Kahneman’s
contribution to the behavioral law and economics movement specifically and legal theory in
general, see generally Russell Korobkin, Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1349 (2013).
74. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 7.
75. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV . & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658 (2000); see also
KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 20-21.
76. See KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 20-21.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Stanovich & West, supra note 75, at 659.
79. Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON . PERSP. 25,
26 (2005).
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interpretations.”80 Deliberative thought processes, though more
taxing of one’s attention, thus increase accuracy when compared to
intuitive reactions.81 Systematic, rule-based thinking tends to engage these deliberative systems and overcome intuitive ones.82
Intuitive, System 1 thinking is “emotionally driven” and subject
to biases based upon affect and passion.83 Intuition is “the likely
pathway by which undesirable influences, like the race, gender, or
attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system”84—because overworked judges are otherwise cognitively busy, they are prone to
“make selfish choices, use sexist language, and make superficial
judgments.”85 Reliance on such intuitive systems “leads to what has
been termed the fundamental computational bias in human
cognition—the tendency toward automatic contextualization of
problems.”86 Engagement of deliberative System 2 cognitive pathways is vital to performing effortful acts of self-control that
overcome the “intuitions and impulses of System 1.”87
Intuitive rulings on pretrial evidentiary issues, though certainly
understandable,88 are subject to a plethora of cognitive biases.89 One
stark example is hindsight bias, or the “tendency to overestimate
the predictability of past events” after learning of the actual
outcome.90 In the context of the co-conspirator exception to hearsay,
judges might rely too much on hindsight to conclude erroneously
80. Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process
Theories from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 462, 469 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
81. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 7-9.
82. See id. at 8-9. “Multifactor tests can help ensure that judges consider all relevant
factors and can remind them of their responsibility to base decisions on more than mere
intuition.” Id. at 41; see also KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 65 (“Cognitive strain, whatever its
source, mobilizes System 2, which is more likely to reject the intuitive answer suggested by
System 1.”).
83. Epstein & Pacini, supra note 80, at 469.
84. Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 31.
85. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 41.
86. Stanovich & West, supra note 75, at 659 (citation omitted).
87. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 31.
88. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 35 (“Judges facing cognitive overload due to heavy
dockets or other on-the-job constraints are more likely to make intuitive rather than
deliberative decisions because the former are speedier and easier. Furthermore, being
cognitively ‘busy’ induces judges to rely on intuitive judgement.”).
89. See id. at 19-29.
90. Id. at 24.
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that the harm a conspiracy would work on victims was inevitable.
They might then intuitively assign some blameworthiness to a
defendant for that conspiracy’s activities, leading them to admit into
evidence everything that the defendant’s co-conspirators did or said
even if the defendant was later withdrawn or excommunicated.
When criminal judges make intuitive rulings on co-conspirator
statements, they sacrifice accuracy and neutrality in normatively
unacceptable ways.91 The hearsay rule exists to exclude inherently
unreliable statements—second-hand stories by one witness about
what another witness may have said—from the evidence introduced
at trial.92 The co-conspirator exception ought to apply only in situations where a statement is clearly more reliable than ordinary
hearsay because a co-conspirator meaningfully and accurately
speaks for and represents a partner in crime. As the following
Section explains, intuitive judicial rulings lead to inconsistent
results that fail to accurately determine the reliability of coconspirator statements and present the appropriate factual background to the judge and jury.
C. Intuition and Inconsistency on Co-Conspirator Hearsay Issues
Examples of judicial inconsistency in pretrial rulings on the coconspirator exception are plentiful. For example, consider statements made after a conspiracy has achieved its primary objective,
but while the co-conspirators remain intent on concealing the conspiracy’s past existence. As a general rule, courts will not find a
subsidiary conspiracy to conceal once the primary conspiracy has
ended.93 The Northern District of Iowa applied that reasoning in
United States v. Honken when a co-defendant attempted to convince
91. See Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 784 (“[U]nder certain circumstances judges rely
on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous judgments.”); see also Guthrie et al.,
supra note 9, at 13-29. For that reason, Guthrie and his co-authors suggest that “deliberative
decision making is more likely than intuitive decision making to lead to just outcomes.” Id.
at 6.
92. See FED . R. EVID . 802.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 610 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D.P.R. 1985) (“[O]nce the
central criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to
conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy
was kept a secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape
detection and punishment.”).
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another inmate to confess falsely to the murder of several witnesses
to her conspiracy with the defendant.94 She drew maps of the
location of the bodies to aid in that false confession.95 The court
reasoned that because the maps were made after the co-defendants
had been arrested and were designed only to conceal the conspiracy,
they were not made “in the course of ” it and thus did not trigger the
co-conspirator hearsay exception.96
Other courts, however, have taken precisely the opposite position
and readily implied an agreement among co-defendants to conceal
a completed conspiracy, thereby rendering statements made during
that concealment admissible against the defendant. For example,
the Eastern District of Washington held in United States v. White
that a conspiracy to dispose of hazardous waste illegally “would
necessarily entail a conspiracy to ensure that the true nature of the
acts would not be uncovered.”97 Thus, the court admitted statements
made while the co-defendants were under investigation for their
activities, finding just the type of conspiracy that other courts have
refused to find.98 The Eleventh Circuit approved of a similar
inference in United States v. Trent, in which it considered a codefendant’s statement about the filing of false tax returns and
submission of false statements in 2006 to conceal a conspiracy to
defraud a local housing authority in 2003.99 That court held the
statements could be admitted even if the primary purpose of the
conspiracy had long been achieved.100 The court deduced that
“concealment was a necessary part of the conspiracy” to execute a
“continuing scheme of theft from the [housing authority] from 2001
until at least 2003,” thereby inferring an agreement to conceal the
underlying criminal enterprise.101
94. 378 F. Supp. 2d 928, 944 (N.D. Iowa 2004).
95. Id. at 947.
96. See id. at 960. In a similar vein, the Middle District of Pennsylvania has held that a
co-conspirator’s handwritten, post-arrest confession to all the activities of a conspiracy aimed
to absolve the defendant entirely was written “with the intent to allocate liability post hoc
rather than to facilitate the needs of an ongoing enterprise” and thus was inadmissible under
the co-conspirator exception. United States v. Davis, 208 F. Supp. 3d 628, 633-34 (2016).
97. 766 F. Supp. 873, 888 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
98. See id.
99. 306 F. App’x 482, 484 (11th Cir. 2009).
100. Id. at 486.
101. Id.
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Similar inconsistencies abound in rulings on the admissibility of
statements made before the defendant actually entered a conspiracy
with his co-defendants. Some appellate courts have counseled
against admitting such statements. In United States v. Davis, the
Fourth Circuit held that statements made by a co-defendant in a
drug conspiracy were inadmissible at trial when those statements
were made eight years before the charged conspiracy in the case and
the co-defendant was imprisoned in the interim.102 Even though the
statements concerned the same drug distribution activities as the
charged conspiracy did, they were not made “in furtherance of” a
conspiracy that they significantly predated and thus did not qualify
for the co-conspirator exception.103 In a similar decision in United
States v. Hill, the Eastern District of New York excluded evidence
that, months before the defendant participated in a conspiracy to
rob the victim, his co-defendants participated in a similar robbery.104
Other district courts, however, have offered more expansive interpretations of the exception that render statements made before the
defendant actually entered the conspiracy admissible. The District
of Colorado has held that co-conspirator statements may be admitted against a defendant who joins the conspiracy after those
statements have been made.105 Thus, the court held in United States
v. Brown that because the overarching conspiracy had multiple
criminal objectives that required some participants to leave and join
it during its lifetime, statements that co-conspirators had made
before the defendant joined were admissible at his trial.106 Similarly,
102. See 67 F. App’x 771, 775-76 (4th Cir. 2003).
103. Id. at 776.
104. Though the district court’s ruling was not published, the Second Circuit affirmed it
in United States v. Hill, 279 F. App’x 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008).
Though these examples suggest otherwise, appellate courts far more frequently interpret
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule in ways that disfavor defendants. For
example, some courts have implied that a conversation discussing the rotating membership
of a conspiracy might sufficiently further that enterprise so as to render the conversation
admissible at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 756 F.3d, 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Arias, 252 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2001). Others have ruled that a
conversation about excommunicating members of the conspiracy other than the present
defendant might be admissible against that defendant, even though the membership of that
conspiracy has changed without any express approval from the defendant himself. See, e.g.,
United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 1998).
105. See United States v. Brown, 755 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo. 1991).
106. See id.
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in United States v. Carter
that where a co-conspirator spoke to an undercover agent about a
potential conspiracy to launder money using the defendant’s
business well before the defendant agreed to anything, the coconspirator’s statements were nonetheless admissible at his trial.107
Because the defendant was later found to be a member of the conspiracy and the statements were made to further it, they were
admissible against him even though he had not yet begun his
involvement when they were made.108
Why is such inconsistency so prevalent in rulings on the coconspirator exception? Behavioral law and economics theory offers
several plausible explanations.
First, judges are too cognitively busy to overcome intuitive
processing on pretrial evidentiary rulings and engage their deliberative cognitive faculties to correct errors.109 When our deliberative
“System 2” faculties are “otherwise engaged, we will believe almost
anything,” often with little supporting evidence.110 When decisionmakers are engaged in multiple effortful tasks at the same time, as
judges are when managing punishingly crowded dockets, they tend
to “go with the flow” of intuitive processing with little oversight from
deliberative cognitive systems.111
Second, judges themselves are placed in powerful positions that
reinforce false confidence in their own intuitions.112 Judges are made
to feel powerful in the criminal courtroom, where they exercise neardictatorial control over the other players in the criminal justice
system.113 That powerful position renders judges unapologetic for,
if not proud of, their reliance upon their own intuitive faculties.114
107. 966 F. Supp. 336, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
108. Id.
109. See KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 41.
110. Id. at 81 (“System 1 is gullible and biased to believe, System 2 is in charge of doubting
and unbelieving, but System 2 is sometimes busy, and often lazy. Indeed, there is evidence
that people are more likely to be influenced by empty persuasive messages, such as
commercials, when they are tired and depleted.”).
111. See id. at 135.
112. See id.
113. For instance, judges may often assign defense attorneys to complete menial tasks if
clerks are unavailable. LISA J. MCINTYRE , THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN
THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE 88 (1987).
114. See WICE, supra note 70, at 124.
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They believe that their own experiences qualify them to rely upon
learned hunches to make consistent, accurate rulings.115
Third, and contrary to judges’ beliefs discussed above, the characteristics of pretrial co-conspirator hearsay questions make them
especially troubling topics for experts to resolve with intuition.116
Intuitive judgments can reflect real expertise when there is “an environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable” and when
“the quality and speed of feedback” is high, so that experts have
enough opportunity to practice.117 Pretrial evidentiary questions
provide neither. They arise from the unpredictable richness of real
life and true crime. Furthermore, because pretrial evidentiary rulings are discretionary, they are not the subject of extensive, let
alone immediate, feedback from higher courts.118 Appellate courts
are generally unwilling to overturn convictions that are based upon
erroneous evidentiary rulings.119 “[T]he appeals courts have historically rubber-stamped the decisions of trial courts in these areas ...
utilizing the harmless error doctrine.”120 Thus, higher courts have
provided little guidance on the myriad complexities of the evidentiary rules that criminal courts must apply over and over again.121
The combination of factual irregularity and occasional—or entirely
absent—feedback perpetuates judicial inconsistency in pretrial evidentiary rulings on the co-conspirator exception.
Judges’ inconsistent application of the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule allows enterprising prosecutors to expand that evidentiary rule, thereby admitting more and more unreliable evidence
against defendants. Prosecutors can use the device more readily as
trial courts lower the requirements for evidence of the defendant’s
115. See id. Unfortunately, “the confidence that people have in their intuition is not a
reliable guide to their validity.” KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 239-40.
116. See KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 240; see also Hogarth et al., supra note 7, at 379.
117. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 240-41.
118. See MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 969.
119. See Uphoff, supra note 5, at 539 (citing Berger, supra note 9, at 894-96); see also
Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 32.
120. MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 969.
121. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has avoided directly addressing the
admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay statements. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 176 n.1 (1987) (The Court “do[es] not express an opinion on the proper order of proof that
trial courts should follow in concluding that the preponderance standard has been satisfied
in an ongoing trial.”).
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involvement in an underlying conspiracy.122 Some federal prosecutors have begun to argue “a revised definition of the Exception itself,
arguing that the ‘conspiracy’ joined by the defendant and declarant
need not ‘have as its object an unlawful purpose.’”123 A 2010 study
of just eight of the federal circuits found some 2500 cases where
prosecutors relied upon the exception since its 1975 adoption.124
Yet justice requires consistent, even-handed pretrial evidentiary
rulings. Erroneous rulings on pretrial evidentiary issues can have
dramatic trickle-down effects on the ultimate outcome of the case.125
Those rulings often dictate which charges the State will pursue at
trial and the narrative jurors will construct from the evidence, determining both the course of litigation and the range of counts upon
which the jury will deliberate.126 “[T]he results of [pretrial evidentiary] motions, right or wrong, will alter the narrative developed by
a jury, whatever the righteous or devious intentions of counsel and
the judge.”127 Erroneous pretrial evidentiary rulings are frequently
the culprit when a convicted defendant is later exonerated in post122. See Trachtenberg, supra note 15, at 612-13.
123. Id. at 612.
124. Id. at 623. Though it is outside the scope of this Article, over time such pretrial
evidentiary rulings may begin to skew significantly against defendants. “Most judges,
especially those with prosecutorial experience, presume that most defendants are, in fact,
guilty.” Uphoff, supra note 5, at 543. Anecdotal evidence of antidefendant bias is also
prevalent. Judges openly favor prosecutors in many death penalty cases, frequently at the
expense of defendants’ constitutional rights. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 71, at 792-811.
The pressures of judicial election enhance the antidefendant bias, making judges more
punitive to defendants; judges often have experience in a prosecutor’s office and thus “bring
a decidedly pro-prosecution attitude to the bench.” Uphoff, supra note 5, at 529. “The most
common legal experience among ... judges, aside from the general category of working in a law
firm ... was a former position with the local district attorney’s office.” WICE, supra note 70, at
96. For instance, in Philadelphia, 50 percent of trial court judges had prior experience as
prosecutors, while 15 percent had served in the public defender’s office. Id. at 110.
Christopher Slobogin has argued that this pro-prosecution bias is also reflected in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Having it Both Ways:
Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court Is “Unfairly” Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743
(1996).
125. See, e.g., MacKillop & Vidmar, supra note 4, at 958 (“[E]stablished evidentiary
doctrines are sometimes compelling incorrect verdicts by presenting the juries with
incomplete and inaccurate evidence while expecting them to develop complete and accurate
narratives.”).
126. See id. at 962-63 (noting the frequency with which erroneous pretrial evidentiary
rulings can lead to convictions of defendants who are later proven innocent in postconviction
proceedings).
127. Id. at 974.

2019]

JUSTICE BEGINS BEFORE TRIAL

2209

conviction proceedings.128 Error-prone, intuitive decision making
should not be the norm on such important pretrial evidentiary
questions. As Professor Kahneman has argued:
[J]umping to conclusions is efficient if the conclusions are likely
to be correct and the costs of an occasional mistake acceptable,
and if the jump saves much time and effort. Jumping to conclusions is risky when the situation is unfamiliar, the stakes are
high, and there is no time to collect more information.129

Pretrial evidentiary rulings exemplify the latter scenario and
require more deliberative decision-making procedures.130
III. THE NUDGE TOWARD DELIBERATIVE REASONING: APPLYING
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW CONCEPTS TO THE CO-CONSPIRATOR
EXCEPTION
Although [h]umans are not irrational, they often need help to
make more accurate judgments and better decisions, and in
some cases policies and institutions can provide that help.131

In this Part, I argue that overworked criminal judges can apply
uniform commercial laws that focus on the liabilities of members
of a complex, opaque, profit-motivated organization to co-conspirator hearsay questions. Such application is possible because of the
striking resemblance conspiratorial arrangements bear to existing
commercial organizations, aside from their illicit aims.132 In addition,
128. “[E]videntiary issues at trial are a very common causal factor in wrongful convictions.”
Id. at 980. Many cases where a convicted defendant was later exonerated “reflect questionable
evidentiary rulings that clearly modified the narrative options for juries to consider.” Id. at
969.
129. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 79.
130. See id. at 241 (“It is wrong to blame anyone for failing to forecast accurately in an
unpredictable world. However, it seems fair to blame professionals for believing they can
succeed in an impossible task. Claims for correct intuitions in an unpredictable situation are
self-delusional at best, sometimes worse.”).
131. Id. at 411.
132. Applying concepts drawn from uniform commercial laws to co-conspirator exception
questions will also ensure that similar organizational structures in the criminal and
commercial realms are treated similarly. For an extended discussion of the necessity of
treating like cases alike, which elsewhere I have labeled “formal justice,” see Gentithes, supra
note 26, at 845-47; see also Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW
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uniform commercial laws are amenable to formal checklists and
decision trees, which can be applied to significantly reduce error
even on complex cognitive tasks.133 Judges who apply such techniques will stimulate deliberative decision-making in their pretrial
evidentiary rulings, which in turn will increase the accuracy of
those rulings and check the growth of antidefendant rules of
evidence.
A. Uniform Commercial Laws and Predictability
Uniform commercial laws have been developed specifically to
enhance the predictability of arms-lengths transactions in the economic sphere. For instance, among the self-defined “underlying
purposes and policies” of the UCC is its effort “to simplify, clarify,
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions” and “to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”134 The
RUPA similarly has uniform legal treatment of partnerships at its
core. The preface to the RUPA suggests that it is “largely a series of
‘default rules’ that govern the relations among partners in situations they have not addressed in a partnership agreement,”135 and
it “reflects an attempt to craft default rules that are efficient and
89, 89 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (“[A] decision maker who has decided a kind of case in
accordance with a given principle today logically commits himself to deciding a similar case
tomorrow in accordance with that principle.”). Treating relevantly similar commercial and
illicit arrangements in the same way is normatively sound simply because that is the fairest
treatment possible. See Raleigh Hannah Levine & Russell Pannier, Comparative and
Noncomparative Justice: Some Guidelines for Constitutional Adjudication, 14 WM . & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 141, 147 (2005) (citing JOEL FEINBERG , SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 100 (1973)).
133. See, e.g., GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 154 (citing successful error reduction after
introduction of safety checklists in various hospitals, including the use of one surgical safety
checklist used in eight worldwide hospitals to reduce major complications by 36 percent and
deaths by 47 percent).
134. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997); see also A. Brooke Overby,
Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 ALA. L. REV. 351,
355 (2005) (Recent revisions to the U.C.C. “sought both to make uniform areas of the law that
had been subject to different interpretations by ... state courts, and to update the U.C.C. to
address new technology, changes in banking practices, federal preemption issues, and newer
forms of payment devices which had been inadequately accommodated by the original versions
of Articles 3 and 4.”). Even where it falls short of that goal, predictability is plainly at the
heart of the project that the drafters of the code hoped to achieve.
135. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, Preface (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997). That “[t]he primary
focus of RUPA is the small, often informal partnership” counsels in favor of applying it to
necessarily informal illicit organizations. Id.
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fair.”136 Those default rules have been adopted by nearly all the
states.137 Criminal lawyers and judges alike have much to gain from
appropriating such predictability when applying the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.
Many tenets of uniform commercial laws were generated to delineate when the various members of an organization are liable to
third parties for that organization’s actions. As an example, the
RUPA made changes to the existing law regarding a partner’s power
to act as an agent of the entity in an effort to “enhance[ ] the
protection of persons dealing with a partnership unfamiliar to
them.”138 The RUPA thus codified the English rule that a partner
has the authority to bind the partnership as a whole when he
engages in “business of the kind carried on by the partnership.”139
The RUPA also protects third parties when a partnership agrees to
limit one partner’s actual authority to carry on ordinary partnership business. That partner can still bind the partnership in transactions with third parties who did not “kn[ow] or ... receive[ ] a
notification” of the lack of authority.140
Another aim of the RUPA was to correct partnership law’s prior
assumption that the partnership as a whole terminates each time
a partner leaves, and if the remaining members wish to perpetuate
it, then they must renew all of its old contracts and receive the old
partnership’s property in a legal transfer.141 The RUPA established
136. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The
Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW . 1, 2 (1993).
137. Such consistent legal rules are a primary driver of a nation’s economic success; “ruleof-law indicators are highly predictive of per capita GDP, irrespective of other factors or the
overall level of economic freedom.” Edwin J. Feulner, The Rule of Law, in 2013 INDEX OF
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 35, 35 (2013). “[The] rule of law, by empowering individuals within a
stable and predictable environment, is [a] reliable factor in promoting development.” Id. at
36.
138. Weidner & Larson, supra note 136, at 31 (discussing R.U.P.A. § 301(1)).
139. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301(1).
140. Id.
141. As the reporters for the RUPA have noted, the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)
assumption “suggests that the partnership business is coming to a close when all that may
be coming to a close is one partner’s participation.” Weidner & Larson, supra note 136, at 5;
see also Arnold M. Wensinger, Note, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup
Provisions: Stability or Headache?, 50 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 905, 918 (1993) (noting that under
the U.P.A., “[a]ll authority of any partner to act for the partnership and therefore to bind the
other partners ceases upon dissolution of the partnership, except to the extent necessary to
wind up the partnership affairs”).
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that a partnership does not dissolve each time a partner leaves, but
only upon certain specified events.142 Criminal defense attorneys
have similarly argued that the departure of one member of a
conspiracy leads ipso facto to its complete termination.143 But just
as the RUPA suggests that the circumstances of a partner’s exit, not
the mere fact of the exit itself, determines whether the partnership
dissolves or carries on with new membership,144 the circumstances
of a co-conspirator’s exit should control whether the remaining
conspiracy can still create legal liability for the departed and
remaining members. The exit itself is not determinative, as some
courts have recognized.145
The RUPA also curbs remaining partners’ abilities to render a
departing partner personally liable for partnership transactions.
Under that regime, a departing partner is liable for partnership
obligations to third parties who “reasonably believed that the
dissociated partner was ... a partner” at the time of the transaction
and “did not have notice of the partner’s dissociation,” which will be
assumed ninety days after the partnership files a statement of
dissociation.146 Furthermore, under the RUPA, third parties who
believe the dissociated partner is still a partner and extend credit
on that misunderstanding can hold that dissociating partner
liable.147 The RUPA thus “sheds light on the continuing liability of
142. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801. The RUPA established two tracks for the departure
of a partner, one which leads to the winding up of the partnership as a whole and another
which leads to a buyout of the departing partner while the remaining partners continue to
conduct business. See generally id. art. 6-8; Weidner & Larson, supra note 136, at 6-8.
143. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 1998).
144. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801.
145. As discussed earlier, the Sixth Circuit has recognized this general principle in holding
that a co-conspirator’s statements made after the exclusion of a third member of a conspiracy
may still be admissible against the defendant. See Maliszewski, 161 F.3d at 1008 (“[T]here is
no rule that says if some members of a conspiracy talk about getting rid of another member,
that conversation is not in furtherance of the first conspiracy, but is instead directed at an
entirely new conspiracy.”). Though the court did not directly cite the RUPA in support, its
logic follows from a reading of that uniform law.
146. REVISED UNIF . P’SHIP ACT §§ 702(a), 704(c); see also Weidner & Larson, supra note
136, at 15. The RUPA’s rule also works in reverse, limiting the departing partner’s ability to
obligate his former partners to the same class of transactions entered into with third parties
who reasonably believed that the dissociated partner was then a partner and did not have
notice of the partner’s dissociation. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 702(a).
147. Wensinger, supra note 141, at 930 (discussing REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 703(b)).
Thus, where the third party extends credit to the partnership while relying upon the newly
dissociated partner’s credit history, they may hold that dissociated partner liable. Id.
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partners after a ... dissolution or beginning of a winding up and
termination.”148
The UCC’s drafters were similarly focused on resolving “issues of
responsibility and liability,” specifically in light of the complexity of
the modern banking system and the technologies banks commonly
employ.149 In some instances, this focus even led to defining the
proper plaintiffs and defendants in actions under the Code,150 which
is crucial because “[t]he allocation of losses between the ... parties
is accomplished through application of a series of UCC causes of
action and defenses.”151
148. Id. at 931 (discussing REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 803). As I discuss more in Part IV
below, applying the RUPA’s policy regarding postdissociation liability to conspiracies would
likewise ensure that a dissociated conspirator can only create criminal liability for the
remaining conspirators, and likewise can only be criminally liable for the remaining
conspirators’ actions, where it is reasonable to believe that a new transaction occurred while
the full conspiracy was ongoing, without direct evidence of one co-conspirator’s exit. This
serves as a limitation on unfettered criminal liability and a useful heuristic for trial courts
to establish when co-conspirator statements can be admitted as proof of criminal liability
amidst shifts in a conspiracy’s membership.
149. Richard J. Scislowski, Comment, The U.C.C. Section 4-205(2) Payment/Deposit
Warranty: Allow a Drawer to Hold a Depositary Bank Liable For Collecting an Item With a
Forged Indorsement, 28 AKRON L. REV. 573, 574 (1995) (citing Revised Article 3, Prefatory
Note, Purpose of the Drafting Effort, ¶ 2); see also James Stuart Bailey, Allocation of Loss for
Forged Checks under Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. and the Proposed Revisions Thereto, 22
PAC. L.J. 1263, 1266 (1991) (“The Uniform Commercial Code ... allocates the risk of loss for
forged checks in Articles 3 and 4.”); Overby, supra note 134, at 352 (noting that revisions to
the code “allocat[e] losses for check fraud” and “expand the number of defenses that banks
potentially can raise in attempting to shift losses to another party”).
150. See Overby, supra note 134, at 367 (“A goal of the revisions was to streamline the
litigation that inevitably follows in the wake of check fraud. Therefore, the section addressing
conversion attempts to resolve a significant amount of litigation that occurred under the
original U.C.C. regarding which parties are properly the defendants in a conversion action
and which parties are properly the plaintiffs.”). For more on the proper plaintiffs to a
conversion action under the revisions, see Wayne K. Lewis & Michael Gentithes, Hey, But It’s
My Money! Ownership and the Enforcement of Conversion Liability Under U.C.C. § 3-420, 33
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 191 (2013).
151. Overby, supra note 134, at 358.
[L]osses under the U.C.C. were and are placed, in the usual case, upon one of the
banks involved in the collection process. In the case of forged drawer’s
signatures, the loss is placed on the payor bank (the bank that paid the check
and the bank where the drawer opened the checking account). In the case of
forged indorsements and alterations, the loss is placed on the first party who
dealt with the thief.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Banks and Their Customers
Under the Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4: Allocation of Losses
Resulting from Forged Drawers’ Signatures, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1991).
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For example, warranty provisions introduced in Article 4 of the
UCC seek to “place the loss on the person who could best have prevented the loss” in the event of a forged indorsement on a check.152
These provisions, in part, allocate losses between banks and their
customers for checks with forged drawer signatures, as well as
between banks where the payor bank recredits its customer’s
account.153 Similarly, section 3-405 of the UCC allocates losses from
fraudulent indorsements made by an employee between the
drawer/employer, the drawee bank, and the depository bank, generally adopting “the principle that the risk of loss for fraudulent
indorsements by employees who are entrusted with responsibility
with respect to checks should fall on the employer rather than the
bank that takes the check or pays it.”154 Because allocating such loss
is critically important to the smooth functioning of our commercial
banking system,155 the drafters of the UCC created rules on the topic
that are clear and easy to apply.156
Uniform commercial laws determine the liability that members
of a complex, profit-motivated organization will bear for agreements
made with third parties. If there are enough objective similarities
152. Scislowski, supra note 149, at 606 (collecting cases); Overby, supra note 134, at 361
(describing how the Code generally places losses for forged drawer’s signatures initially on
the payor bank and for forged indorsements or alterations on the first party to take the
instrument after the theft).
153. Ellis & Dow, supra note 151, at 58-59. Ellis and Dow go on to argue in favor of a twotiered liability allocation system, depending upon the amount of the check at issue. Id. at 7577.
154. U.C.C. § 3-405 official cmt. 1 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2017) (“Section 3405 is based on the belief that the employer is in a far better position to avoid the loss by care
in choosing employees, in supervising them, and in adopting other measures to prevent forged
indorsements on instruments payable to the employer or fraud in the issuance of instruments
in the name of the employer.”).
155. See Scott D. Benner, Commercial Law: Loss Allocation Under U.C.C. Article 4A, 1
ANN . SURV. AM . L. 239, 239 (1990) (“In modern society, the swift and certain transfer of
payments is a vital grease to the wheels of commerce.”); Overby, supra note 134, at 356 (“A
key issue in devising a regulatory scheme for the [check payment] system is to establish a
legal structure for allocating those losses.”); see also Benjamin Geva, Forged Check
Indorsement Losses Under the UCC: The Role of Policy in the Emergence of Law Merchant
From Common Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1733, 1751-52 (2000) (explaining the commercial
banking principles that different loss allocation systems promote and favor).
156. See, e.g., Benner, supra note 155, at 241 (describing how the drafters of Article 4A of
the UCC responded to inadequacies in the existing law to define liabilities arising from
electronic funds transfers); Overby, supra note 134, at 398 (“The revisions [to the UCC] do
evidence an attempt to establish a comprehensive allocation scheme for check fraud losses.”).
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between licit and illicit profit-motivated organizations,157 then the
principles of uniform commercial laws can usefully be applied to
conspiracies to determine which statements by co-conspirators create binding relationships on behalf of the conspiracy and thereby
create criminal liability for the defendant conspirator, which would
in turn render the statements admissible at his trial.158
B. Uniform Commercial Laws’ Applicability to Illicit and Licit
Profit-Motivated Organizations
Illicit and licit sale and distribution arrangements are similar
enough to justify their similar treatment. Thieves may not be honorable, but they are rational. They have the same motivations to enter
into a conspiratorial agreement that similarly rational actors in the
business world have to enter into a contract. Conspirators and businessmen both seek profits for the benefit of all involved in the
enterprise. The agreements may even concern identical goods that
were simply acquired through different means.159 A sale of goods is
a sale of goods, whether it occurs in the sunshine of commerce or the
shadows of conspiracy.160 The law should analyze them identically
as a matter of formal justice.161
As discussed in Part I, one of the primary justifications for the coconspirator exception is the belief that a defendant should be held
accountable for his co-conspirators’ statements in the same way a
principal is accountable for his agent’s statements.162 That justifica-

157. In other circumstances, Christopher Peters has argued that the principle of treating
like parties alike is somewhat tautological; in fact, it is equivalent to stating that “‘[p]eople
identically entitled to the relevant treatment are entitled to be treated identically’—that is,
are identically entitled to that treatment.” Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2059 (1996). Though I
do not subscribe to that tautology thesis, it does highlight an important problem for the
“formal justice” ethos: when are “like” cases similar enough to justify “alike” treatment?
“Other principles are required to determine what features of a case are the relevant ones for
determining how the parties are to be treated, and thus in determining what the relevant
similarities and dissimilarities are.” Benditt, supra note 132, at 90.
158. See infra Part IV (discussing specific examples where commercial codes provide ready
answers to co-conspirator evidentiary questions).
159. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 206-07, 210-11 (1940).
160. See id.
161. See Gentithes, supra note 26, at 845-47.
162. See supra Part I.
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tion is based on a close analogy between commercial and conspiratorial arrangements.163 Some have argued against the exception as a
whole on the grounds that a conspiracy’s members “lack the power
to control or authorize other members’ actions.”164 But that objection
wrongly assumes that disorganization prevails in conspiratorial
arrangements.165 The sophistication of those organizations should
not be discounted.166 Co-conspirators are capable of managing
complex transactions, assigning members specific tasks, and giving
some members authority to speak for the group in specific
contexts.167 Drug conspiracies often have roles for suppliers, distributors, retail salesmen, and other analogues to corporate actors.168
The sophistication of such conspiracies counsels in favor of their
similar treatment to licit business arrangements.169
Illegality of the subject matter of an agreement is not a distinction that requires distinct treatment. Consider a supply chain where
an early party acquired a key component of a finished good either in
violation of a contractual agreement or by exceeding some government permission.170 Those who later sell and distribute the finished
good would still expect the UCC to apply to their transactions, even
though the goods exchanged in those transactions are, in a sense,
illegal.171 When the goods that start a conspiratorial sales arrangement are stolen or obtained without government approval, the
transactions the conspiracy then undertakes can also be analyzed
fruitfully under the UCC.172 Principles of uniform commercial law
apply in the same manner to identical arrangements for the sale

163. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
164. See Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation—A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 714, 755 (1965).
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 419-21 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a
complex financial conspiracy).
167. See, e.g., id.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 67 F. App’x 771, 774 (4th Cir. 2003).
169. See Gentithes, supra note 26, at 848-49.
170. See, e.g., Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Recycle Green Servs., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 260, 268-69
(E.D.N.Y. 2014).
171. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM . LAW . INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2017) (defining the
applicability of the UCC to all transactions in goods); id. § 2-105(1) (defining the term
“goods”).
172. See id. § 2-102.
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and distribution of magnets, milk, and machinery.173 Criminal
courts can also fruitfully apply those principles to relevantly similar
arrangements for the sale and distribution of methamphetamine or
mescaline.174
Treating identical arrangements for the sale and distribution of
licit and illicit goods alike also preserves the Dworkinian “integrity”
of our commercial jurisprudence, with possible gains for that field
of law.175 As Ronald Dworkin argued, the law at its best seeks
integrity by forcing us to extend our legal rules into new areas and
to use those new cases to reevaluate the propriety of those rules in
their original contexts.176 This is part of the common-law process
through which provisional legal rules “work[ themselves] pure” over
time.177 For Dworkin, such internal consistency amongst our norms
is one of the ultimate aims of the law.178
Dworkin’s views suggest that applying uniform commercial laws
to conspiratorial arrangements could revitalize the original body of
commercial law and simplify the decision-making process for overworked criminal judges.179 Conspirators may be more comfortable
with organizational forms that include loosely aligned actors who
participate in the conspiracy at different levels of involvement at
different times, depending upon the needs of the overall organization. Because the conspiracy will often be in flux as members face
prosecution or worse, such fluidity is a practical necessity for illicit
organizations. That necessity may lead to the invention of organizational structures useful to licit enterprises.180 Businesses in a global
economy are increasingly characterized by dynamic, complex supply
chains and therefore face similar challenges caused by the pace of
173. Cf. id.
174. This Article's focus is the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, not conspiracy
law in general.
175. Cf. DWORKIN , supra note 26, at 188.
176. See id. at 89-90; see also Gentithes, supra note 26, at 848-49 (discussing Dworkin’s
theory of integrity).
177. DWORKIN , supra note 26, at 400.
178. See RONALD DWORKIN , JUSTICE IN ROBES 13 (2006); see also DWORKIN , supra note 26,
at 188 (“[A] political society that accepts integrity as a political virtue thereby becomes a
special form of community, special in a way that promotes its moral authority to assume and
deploy a monopoly of coercive force.”).
179. See DWORKIN , supra note 26, at 89-90.
180. See EAMONN KELLY & KELLY MARCHESE, Supply Chains and Value Webs, in BUSINESS
ECOSYSTEMS COME OF AGE 55, 55 (2015).
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change in those supply chains.181 Commercial jurisprudence thus
stands to gain from a free exchange of ideas with conspiracy jurisprudence.
C. How Uniform Commercial Laws Engage Judges’ Deliberative
Faculties
Busy criminal judges face inherently difficult pretrial rulings on
evidentiary issues, such as the co-conspirator exception to hearsay,
and receive little guidance or feedback on these problems from higher courts.182 Those judges must find ways to engage their deliberative cognitive processes to reduce error without sacrificing speed.183
Fortunately, uniform commercial laws offer a useful rubric by which
judges can deliberatively answer co-conspirator exception issues
with both accuracy and speed.
As any law student who hazards a study of commercial paper or
partnership law well knows, these subjects are amenable to checklists from which correct answers can be quickly derived. Commercial
outlines that graphically map the factors at play allow students to
arrive at answers in these fields under the time pressure of final
exams.184 Students find such checklists helpful because they remind
them of information they already learned and trigger deliberative,
System 2 cognitive processes to resolve exam problems.185 In his
book on the value of checklists to reduce error in medicine, Dr. Atul
Gawande extols their ability to counter the “fallibility of human
memory and attention” by “remind[ing] us of the minimum necessary steps and mak[ing] them explicit.”186 In complex conditions,

181. See id.
182. See supra notes 109-11, 116-18 and accompanying text.
183. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 33 (“[J]udges should use deliberation as a verification mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable either
because feedback is absent or because judges face cues likely to induce misleading reliance
on heuristics.”); see also KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 417 (“The way to block errors that
originate in System 1 is simple in principle: recognize the signs that you are in a cognitive
minefield, slow down, and ask for reinforcement from System 2.”).
184. See, e.g., RICHARD J. CONVISER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 30 (7th ed. 2014); DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, COMMERCIAL PAPER & PAYMENT LAW 30
(17th ed. 2013).
185. Cf. GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 120-21.
186. Id. at 36.
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checklists can aid judgment without eliminating it.187 Checklists
trigger the deliberative faculties by prompting users to conduct
more complex steps, enforcing discipline upon the user but leaving
room for independent thought.188
If judges rely on similar checklists and decision trees to resolve
co-conspirator hearsay issues, then they will engage their deliberative processes and rely less on intuition while still generating timely
decisions. Deliberative decisions apply learned rules to new
scenarios.189 Systematic, rule-based thinking tends to engage deliberative processes, which can override faulty intuitive judgments.190
For example, in one decision-making study, judges showed greater
resistance to hindsight bias when given a problem that concerned
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment than they did in other
scenarios.191 The authors hypothesized that “[t]he highly intricate,
rule-bound nature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that guides
probable cause determinations might have facilitated the deliberative ... approach.”192 Because Fourth Amendment problems are typically intricate and require judges to consider a number of factors in
turn before reaching a resolution, judges place less reliance upon
intuition that “might be inconsistent with the governing law” when
resolving such questions.193
In important ways, uniform commercial laws are analogously
intricate. The analysis of both probable cause jurisprudence and
187. See id. at 79 (“[U]nder conditions of complexity, not only are checklists a help, they are
required for success. There must always be room for judgment, but judgment aided—and even
enhanced—by procedure.”).
188. See id. at 120 (“Good checklists ... are precise. They are efficient, to the point, and easy
to use even in the most difficult situations. They do not try to spell out everything—a checklist
cannot fly a plane. Instead, they provide reminders of only the most critical and important
steps—the ones that even the highly skilled professionals using them could miss.... They can
help experts remember how to manage a complex process or configure a complex machine.”).
189. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 7 (citing Frederick, supra note 79, at 26).
190. See id. at 8-9. “Multifactor tests can help ensure that judges consider all relevant
factors and can remind them of their responsibility to base decisions on more than mere
intuition.” Id. at 41.
191. See id. at 26-27.
192. See id. at 27. The results of this study contrasted with another in which judges were
asked to assess the likely outcome of a case on appeal. See id. at 24-25. Judges who were
informed in advance of how the case was actually resolved by an appellate court showed
significant hindsight bias in their evaluation of the likelihood of that particular result. See id.
at 25-26.
193. Id. at 27.
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uniform commercial laws requires consideration of a series of factors
in succession to reach the proper result.194 Both are readily distilled
into formal checklists to guide the user to an answer in light of the
checklist factors.195 Such checklists can “provide reminders of only
the most critical and important steps,” allowing even “experts,” such
as judges, to “remember how to manage a complex process”—such
as applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.196 The
checklists that a study of uniform commercial laws generates are
guides for action that judges can consult as evidentiary questions
arise,197 much like a chef can consult a recipe.198 By referring judges
to relevant analogies between commercial arrangements and conspiratorial ones, these rubrics can trigger judges’ deliberative
faculties, as is appropriate in an area “where intuition is apt to be
unreliable either because feedback is absent or because judges face
cues likely to induce misleading reliance on heuristics.”199
Tests borrowed from uniform commercial laws will also allow
criminal judges to increase their accuracy in rulings on the coconspirator exception, rather than creating inconsistencies that tend
to disfavor defendants.200 The sort of “multifactor tests” that uniform
commercial laws generate “can help ensure that judges consider all
relevant factors and can remind them of their responsibility to base
decisions on more than mere intuition.”201 Experiments with reminder systems designed to engage doctors’ deliberative processes
before they make a diagnosis have had remarkable success, reducing unsafe diagnostic workups by more than 10 percent.202 Similarly,
in a study requiring eight hospitals around the world to utilize a
194. See, e.g., PAUL MARCUS & MELANIE D. WILSON , CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30 (19th ed.
2016); WHALEY, supra note 184, at 30.
195. See, e.g., CONVISER, supra note 184, at 12; MARCUS & WILSON , supra note 194, at 42;
WHALEY, supra note 184, at 24, 30.
196. GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 120.
197. See, e.g., CONVISER, supra note 184, at 12.
198. See GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 123. Gawande, borrowing his terminology from the
aviation industry, refers to this as a “READ-DO checklist.” Id.
199. Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 33.
200. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
201. Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 41.
202. See generally Ramnarayan et al., Diagnostic Omission Errors in Acute Paediatric
Practice: Impact of a Reminder System on Decision-Making, 6 BMC MED. INFORMATICS &
DECISION MAKING 37 (2006) (reporting that physician use of such a reminder system reduced
unsafe diagnostic workups from 45.2 percent to 32.7 percent).
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carefully designed surgical safety checklist, “the rate of major
complications for surgical patients in all eight hospitals fell by 36
percent after introduction of the checklist. Deaths fell 47 percent.”203
Uniform commercial laws can similarly engage the deliberative
processes of criminal judges204 and are thus promising candidates to
reduce error on pretrial evidentiary issues prone to flawed intuitive
thinking.
The substance of uniform commercial laws also makes them a
promising candidate to reduce error in pretrial evidentiary rulings
on the co-conspirator exception. Uniform commercial laws are designed to give consistent, rule-based answers across jurisdictions
and courts.205 They establish a clear set of rules to determine the
liability that members of a complex, opaque, profit-motivated organization will bear for agreements made with third parties.206 They
can be applied in the criminal context to ensure that the proper
parties in an amorphous, opaque, profit-driven conspiracy are criminally liable for the illicit activities the conspiracy undertakes.207 As
I discuss in several specific examples below, uniform commercial
laws can accurately determine when a defendant conspirator is
liable for the statements of his co-conspirators.208
Applying commercial law to the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule also fits with the efficiency justification for the FRE’s
categorical hearsay regime.209 That regime is premised on a general
exclusion of hearsay with specific categorical exceptions.210 Scholars
and the original drafters of the FRE have long argued the merits of
203. GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 154 (“The results had far outstripped what we’d dared to
hope for, and all were statistically highly significant. Infections fell by almost half. The
number of patients having to return to the operating room after their original operations
because of bleeding or other technical problems fell by one-fourth. Overall, in this group of
nearly 4,000 patients, 435 would have been expected to develop serious complications based
on our earlier observation data. But instead just 277 did. Using the checklist had spared more
than 150 people from harm—and 27 of them from death.”).
204. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2017) (listing the requirements for contract modification in a manner that promotes deliberative thinking).
205. See id. § 1-103(a).
206. Cf. id.
207. See infra Part IV (providing examples of how to apply commercial codes to conspiracy
issues).
208. See infra Part IV (discussing specific examples where commercial codes provide ready
answers to co-conspirator evidentiary questions).
209. See Richter, supra note 2, at 1867, 1882-83, 1904.
210. See id. at 1867, 1874.
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a categorical approach over one granting judges more downstream
discretion to resolve hearsay questions as they arise.211
This debate, which faded in the decades after the adoption of the
FRE,212 is raging again today. Critics such as Richard Posner have
called for the abolition of the categorical approach to hearsay, noting
that the categories the FRE excepts from the general ban on
hearsay are based on long-standing “folk psychology” with little
scientific justification.213 Better, Posner argues, to allow trial courts
to make case-by-case determinations on the reliability of out-ofcourt statements than to rely upon idiosyncratic categories based
upon unverified “judicial habit.”214
But a powerful response, such as that proposed by Liesa L.
Richter, is based upon the inefficiency of such a discretionary hearsay regime. Richter argues that “[t]he case-by-case hearsay model
suggested [by Posner] undoubtedly would result in an increased
expenditure of judicial and litigant resources to ascertain the
admissibility of key hearsay evidence and the corresponding value
of a case.”215 Civil litigants would have difficultly evaluating the
value of cases under such a regime and making efficient strategic
choices, while “[o]n the criminal side, such a regime may result in
fewer plea bargains with defendants and prosecutors overestimating
the strength of a case.”216 In both contexts, “trial judges likely would
face increased motions in limine to gauge the admissibility of
hearsay pretrial and would need to resort to time-consuming, casespecific reliability analysis to admit hearsay rather than relying
upon accepted categorical hearsay exceptions.”217 In contrast, the
211. See, e.g., id. at 1870-74 (detailing the debate between FRE drafters Dean John Henry
Wigmore, who favored a series of highly specific categorical rules that would restrict judicial
discretion, and Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who favored more generalized evidence
standards the judge could employ flexibly on a case-by-case basis).
212. For more on the longstanding critiques of the FRE’s categorical approach, see id. at
1874-76.
213. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-801 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 802. Specifically, Posner has proposed allowing the residual hearsay exception
to swallow the categorical exemptions, allowing courts discretion to admit hearsay they find
reliable and likely to enhance the correct outcome, provided the jury can understand the
hearsay’s limitations. Id.
215. Richter, supra note 2, at 1882.
216. Id. at 1883.
217. Id. (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 338
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Federal Rules’ categorical approach to hearsay makes advance
judgments about admissibility easier and more predictable for
litigants.218
By applying uniform commercial law principles to the co-conspirator exception, judges can ensure an accurate allocation of criminal
liability and induce deliberative, rather than intuitive, rulings,
thereby addressing the concerns of critics such as Posner who accuse the categorical hearsay regime of relying upon psychological
assumptions lacking scientific or analytical support.219 At the same
time, judges who apply uniform commercial law principles will use
formalized decision-making techniques to ensure that answers can
still be reached with enough speed to avoid halting the criminal
justice system, as might occur with a purely case-by-case hearsay
regime.220 The “judicial resources” expended when making pretrial
evidentiary rulings will be minimized given the thoroughly developed body of uniform commercial laws.221 To foster consistency and
avoid bringing criminal dockets to a standstill, criminal judges
should utilize commercial law principles to resolve co-conspirator
hearsay questions.

(1961) (acknowledging the increased burden that a discretionary hearsay regime would place
upon trial judges)).
The loss of specific hearsay exceptions would decrease the information litigants
have available to value cases and predict trial outcomes. Such a decrease in ex
ante information would require parties to expend already scarce litigation
resources to ascertain the value of a particular case and the likelihood of success
at trial. Likewise, trial judges would be forced to expend additional judicial
resources ruling on pretrial motions seeking information about the likely
admissibility of hearsay statements.
Id. at 1893-94.
218. Id. at 1884. Richter also highlights the likelihood that a case-by-case approach to
hearsay would lead to inconsistent trial court rulings unlikely to be overturned and molded
into a uniform rule of law in the appellate courts. Id. at 1886-91. Furthermore, “[w]ith an
active scholarly community engaged in debate concerning the specific categorical hearsay
exceptions, irrational foundations and inadequate requirements underlying those exceptions
are certain to be identified” and can become revisions to the FRE regime. Id. at 1900.
219. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-801 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring).
220. See Richter, supra note 2, at 1882-83.
221. See id. at 1893-94.
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IV. COMMERCIAL LAW RESOLUTIONS TO COMMON CO-CONSPIRATOR
EXCEPTION PROBLEMS
The case of Andy, Brian, and Devin discussed in the Introduction
illuminates the utility of uniform commercial laws for courts
analyzing the co-conspirator exception to hearsay. Based on that
example, I consider a variety of potential co-conspirator exception
issues below. These examples show how criminal judges should
approach these questions.
A. Concealing a Dissolved Conspiracy
What if the prosecution seeks to introduce statements made after
a conspiracy has achieved its primary objective but while the coconspirators remain intent on concealing the conspiracy’s past
existence?222 Returning to the hypothetical discussed in the Introduction, suppose that the prosecution decides it lacks sufficient
evidence to prosecute Devin in light of Andy and Brian’s claims that
Devin was not involved in the drug ring. However, years later Andy
is recorded instructing a friend visiting him in prison to break into
informant Isaac’s home and destroy his ledgers, which tracked the
crooked cops’ activities. Andy tells his friend that the cover-up is
necessary “so internal affairs can’t nose around and find out that
Devin was involved.” Are Andy’s conversations admissible if the
prosecutor later brings a case against Devin?
The dissolved criminal enterprise in this scenario is akin to a
partnership in dissolution. The stakeholders in that illicit organization have ceased their economic activity going forward, just as the
partners of an above-board enterprise might.223 Thus, an examination of the legal status of transactions undertaken during the
dissolution process will yield salient answers for criminal courts.
In the normal course of partnership dissolution, “a partner who
has not wrongfully dissociated may participate in winding up the

222. As discussed earlier, this is a topic upon which criminal judges have often reached
conflicting conclusions. See supra Part II.C.
223. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2)(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997) (noting that the
express will of all the partners can trigger the winding up of its business).
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partnership’s business.”224 However, that partner may undertake
only a limited number of activities that will still bind the partnership as a whole. The act of a partner during winding up will only
bind the partnership if it was “appropriate for winding up the partnership business” or if it “would have bound the partnership ...
before dissolution, if the other party to the transaction did not have
notice of the dissolution.”225 In all other situations in which the partnership is not bound, “the faithless partner who purports to act for
the partnership after dissolution may be liable individually to an
innocent third party under the law of agency.”226
By analogy, where a co-conspirator continues to transact business
on behalf of an illicit enterprise that has already achieved its aims
and subsequently dissolved, he may still be acting “in furtherance
of” that conspiracy if his actions are appropriate to the winding up
of the enterprise.227 That is, if Andy was simply telling a friend
shortly after his arrest to sell additional inventory that all three
crooked cops acquired together before dissolving their conspiracy,
then his conversation would still further the conspiracy and would
be admissible in a later trial against Devin. However, Andy’s
instructions to his friend occurred well after he and the others
dissolved their drug ring. Andy furthered an effort at concealment
to which the others never agreed. Andy’s actions would not be
appropriate to winding up that drug conspiracy, and under the
RUPA would not have bound that enterprise while it was a going
concern.228 Andy’s actions are similar to those of a partner who
continues to transact new business for a partnership well after

224. Id. § 803(a). The RUPA “supposedly balance[d] this loss of control by limiting liablity
to third parties” as described earlier under section 703(b). Wensinger, supra note 141, at 93132.
Similarly, in the corporate context certain parties are empowered to continue acting on the
corporation’s behalf as it winds up its affairs. For instance, those parties are designated in a
certificate of dissolution under Delaware’s General Corporation Law. DEL. CODE. ANN . tit. 8,
§ 275(d) (2017).
225. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 804.
226. Id. § 804 cmt.
227. See FED . R. EVID . 801(d)(2)(E).
228. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 804(1).
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dissolution has been triggered.229 Andy has created liabilities only
for Andy personally.230
It is worth noting, however, that Devin could ratify Andy’s actions
and thus render Andy’s later conversations admissible. As discussed
in more detail in the example below, under the UCC, the parties can
act to “ratify” what was originally an unauthorized signature on an
instrument.231 The same may be true when a partner transacts new
business on behalf of a dissolving partnership and his transactions
229. See id. § 804 cmt.; see also, e.g., Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Berkowitz, 644 A.2d 128,
132-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding the signing of an insulation-installation
agreement by one partner, following dissolution of real estate development partnership, was
not appropriate for winding up partnership and did not bind other partners). Such actions are
also similar to those of a corporate officer who continues the normal course of a corporation’s
business even during the postdissolution winding-up process. See, e.g., Moore v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 591 F.2d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding a majority of
jurisdictions “have construed their statutes of dissolution as imposing personal responsibility
on the directors for any liabilities, whether in contract or in tort, incurred in the continued
operations of the dissolved corporation's business after forfeiture of its charter. This construction accords with what was the rule at common law.”); Long Oil Heat, Inc. v. Polsinelli,
11 N.Y.S.3d 277, 278 (App. Div. 2015) (“[A] person who purports to act on behalf of a dissolved
corporation is personally responsible for the obligations incurred.” (citation omitted));
Chatman v. Day, 455 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (“[W]hen the articles of a
corporation are canceled, whether by the Secretary of State or otherwise, the authority of the
corporation to do business ceases and after such termination officers who carry on new
business do so as individuals, lose the protection of the Corporation Act, and are personally
responsible for such obligations as they incur.”).
230. The same result would hold if there were evidence that on a certain date the coconspirators mutually agreed to end their criminal enterprise, yet the government seeks to
introduce later statements made by one of the co-conspirators. For instance, suppose that in
a recorded meeting with Isaac, Andy, Brian and Devin all say this will be their last illicit
transaction. They announce plans to go straight and compete for promotions in the Anytown
force after their hated Chief finally resigned. Nonetheless, weeks later the government
obtains conversations between Isaac and Andy, who continues to provide his own drugs for
resale and asserts he is doing so on behalf of Brian and Devin. In that scenario, too, Andy’s
statements would not be of the sort made during the course of the conspiracy and are not part
of the dissolution process. They would only render Andy himself liable, and should not be
admitted at trial against the other cops.
231. According to section 3-403, “[a]n unauthorized signature may be ratified for all
purposes of this Article.” U.C.C. § 3-403 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIV. LAW COMM ’N 2017).
According to the official comments to section 3-403, “[r]atification is a retroactive adoption of
the unauthorized signature by the person whose name is signed and may be found from
conduct as well as from express statements. For example, it may be found from the retention
of benefits received in the transaction with knowledge of the unauthorized signature.” Id. § 3403 official cmt. The comments also point to agency law as a source of understanding what
constitutes a ratification of an unauthorized signature: “Although the forger is not an agent,
ratification is governed by the rules and principles applicable to ratification of unauthorized
acts of an agent.” Id.
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are later ratified by that partnership.232 Thus, by analogy, when a
defendant ratifies the unauthorized transactions of his co-conspirator, he is again a party liable for the actions of the conspiracy, and
conversations in furtherance of that conspiracy are admissible
against him. If Devin were later to confirm details about the ledgers
with Andy’s friend or otherwise aid in his efforts to destroy them,
then Andy’s conversations would be admissible against him at trial.
B. Transactions Unauthorized by a Former Co-conspirator
Does the exception apply to statements made by co-conspirators
if there is evidence that, at some point prior to making those
statements, the co-conspirators disavowed the defendant from the
conspiracy? Returning again to the hypothetical, assume that Andy
and Brian actually expelled Devin from their conspiracy before the
government recorded any of their statements. They stopped inviting
Devin to meetings about future sales, and they claimed after their
arrests that Devin was never a part of any of their illicit activities.
But in their conversations with Isaac the informant, Andy and
Brian insisted that Devin was still part of the organization, in spite
of Devin’s text messages to Isaac saying he might not see him for a
while. How should a court determine whether the statements Andy
and Brian made to Isaac were made during the course of and in
furtherance of a conspiracy that included Devin, which would render
them admissible at Devin’s trial?233 Both the UCC and the RUPA
provide ready answers based on similar principles.
When a co-conspirator falsely claims that he is acting on the
defendant’s behalf, he is acting in the same manner as an unauthorized signer of an instrument of commercial paper. The co-conspirator is asserting that he speaks for someone who has not preapproved
232. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN , PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 8:19, at 214 (2012) (“[W]hen a partner’s act is not within the scope of the partnership’s
business and is not authorized by the partners, the transaction is still binding on the
partnership if it is ratified by those partners who would have had the power to authorize the
act.”). Similarly, where a corporate officer acts beyond his authorization to wind up a
dissolving corporation, but his transactions are later ratified by that corporation, the officer
is once again shielded from personal liability. See, e.g., In re Ostrom-Martin, Inc., 202 B.R.
267, 274 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (“Ratification will also be found where a corporation, with
knowledge of the facts, retains the benefit of an unauthorized transaction.”).
233. See FED . R. EVID . 801(d)(2)(E).
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his actions or granted him agency to bind him to any such agreements, just as an unauthorized signer purports to have authority for
a person or entity that the signer lacks.234 Under UCC section 3-403,
“an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the signature of
the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays
the instrument or takes it for value.”235 Analogously, if a co-conspirator continues to claim falsely that he is acting on the defendant’s
behalf while speaking to other criminal intermediaries, in fact he
speaks only for himself. Any conversations that take place under
that false pretense are “in furtherance of” a conspiracy that no
longer includes the defendant.236 They are thus inadmissible against
that defendant.237
There are exceptions to this general rule of commercial paper,
however. Under the UCC, a party can ratify what was originally an
unauthorized signature on an instrument.238 For purposes of Article
3, “[r]atification is a retroactive adoption of the unauthorized signature by the person whose name is signed and may be found from
conduct as well as from express statements. For example, it may be
found from the retention of benefits received in the transaction with
knowledge of the unauthorized signature.”239 Thus, any form of
ratification by the analogous criminal defendant—perhaps by
accepting proceeds from transactions of the conspiracy despite
allegedly being disavowed—would serve as ratification of those
transactions and make him a party to those transactions such that
statements made to further those transactions are admissible
against him.240
234. Unauthorized Signature, BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
235. A similar situation arises where multiple signatures are required to constitute an
authorized signature of an organization. In that scenario, “the signature of the organization
is unauthorized if one of the required signatures is lacking.” U.C.C. § 3-403.
236. See FED . R. EVID . 801(d)(2)(E).
237. See id.
238. According to section 3-403, “An unauthorized signature may be ratified for all
purposes of this Article.” U.C.C. § 3-403.
239. Id. official cmt. The comments also point to agency law as a source of understanding
what constitutes a ratification of an unauthorized signature: “Although the forger is not an
agent, ratification is governed by the rules and principles applicable to ratification of
unauthorized acts of an agent.” Id.
240. The principle of ratification is not new to the law of conspiracy, where “[a] conspirator
... is deemed to have ‘ratified’ the statements made by his confederates before he joined an
existing criminal scheme.” Trachtenberg, supra note 15, at 628.
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A review of the RUPA yields similar results. Under RUPA section
703, a dissociated partner is generally not liable for obligations the
partnership incurs after his dissociation.241 There is an exception,
but it applies only when the other party extends credit on the
“reasonabl[e] belie[f] that the dissociated partner was then a partner” and when the other partner “did not have notice of the partner’s dissociation.”242 Thus, only the unsuspecting third-party with
no reasonable belief that a partner has left the organization can
transact business that will still obligate the dissociating partner.
Applying these principles to the scenario outlined above, the
statements would not be admissible against Devin. Andy’s and
Brian’s false statements to Isaac only created personal obligations.
The evidence, in both their own later statements and their actions
to exclude Devin from the transactions they discuss in their recorded statements, shows that they were no longer furthering a
conspiracy that included Devin. Furthermore, it was not reasonable
for Isaac to believe that Devin remained a co-conspirator after he
stopped attending meetings and indicated in his text message that
he might not be involved in future transactions.243 Any agreements
Isaac reached with Andy and Brian would be binding only against
them under the RUPA and would not further a conspiracy that
involved Devin.
Thus, the statements Andy and Brian made do not qualify for the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.244 That could all
241. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 703(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 1997).
242. Id. §§ 703(b), 704(c); see also Wensinger, supra note 141, at 930 (discussing RUPA
section 703(b)). Thus, where the third party extends credit to the partnership while relying
upon the newly dissociated partner’s credit history, they may hold that dissociated partner
liable. Wensinger, supra note 141, at 930.
243. Courts have taken a minimalist interpretation of the “notice” required to absolve a
dissociated partner of future partnership obligations under RUPA section 703(b). For
instance, in In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, the court noted that a simple publication in a local
newspaper of the partner’s dissociation would suffice under section 703(b). 237 B.R. 275, 29395 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (collecting Pennsylvania decisions to the same effect); see also
Wensinger, supra note 141, at 929-30 (noting the RUPA drafters’ intent to maintain the
liberal interpretation of “notice” under the analogous section of the U.P.A.).
244. This hypothetical is adapted from the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in People v.
Cichy, 2016 IL App (2d) 150261. There, the court held that statements by two co-defendants
excluding the defendant from future illicit transactions did not “further the goal of the
charged conspiracy,” and were instead “antithetical to it.” Id. ¶ 25. While the broader
conspiracy involving the defendant still existed at that time, those specific transactions, and
statements made to further them, did not promote its aims and thus could not be admitted
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change, of course, if the State can produce some evidence that Devin
ratified those transactions, either through his conduct or through
the acceptance of some of their proceeds.245
C. Collateral Agreements to a Conspiracy
How should courts evaluate statements that furthered transactions collateral to the primary dealings of the conspiracy? Assume
that two of the three co-conspirators, Andy and Brian, decide to
supplement the profits from reselling drugs they took from crime
scenes by surreptitiously removing weapons from the evidence locker to sell on the street. They describe their agreement to do so in a
recorded conversation with Isaac, whom they seek to use as a fence
for the firearms before splitting the profits. Are those conversations—which do not advance the primary conspiracy between Andy,
Brian and Devin—admissible at Devin’s criminal trial?
The UCC’s version of the common-law collateral agreement rule
provides a ready solution.246 The parol evidence rule controls whether a particular term was properly added to an existing agreement
amongst the parties.247 As a “substantive law which ... defines the
limits of a contract” and “fixes the subject-matter for interpretation,”248 the parol evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction
of proof of a term from outside the four corners of the parties’
written agreement.249 However, by arguing that a subsequent undertaking between the parties was a “collateral agreement,” a
litigant can conveniently avoid the parol evidence rule and introduce evidence of a secondary agreement outside of what otherwise
appears to be a fully integrated contract.250 The litigant asserts that
the collateral agreement is not an addition to the original underagainst the defendant at trial. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
245. See id. ¶ 25.
246. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2017).
247. See Margaret N. Kniffin, Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpretation and the
Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV.
75, 102 (2009).
248. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON , THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631 (1st ed. 1920).
249. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:1 (Richard A. Lord
ed., 4th ed. 2012).
250. See Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 806 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he parol evidence
rule does not apply to a collateral agreement, i.e., a separate contract between the same
parties.”).
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standing of the parties, but rather a wholly separate undertaking.251
The subsequent agreement must appear entirely separate from the
original contract and thus be collateral in form.252 It must also not
contradict any of the express or implied provisions of the written
contract.253 Lastly, it must concern matters the parties would not
ordinarily be expected to embody in the original writing.254
The collateral agreement rule has been codified in UCC section
2-202.255 Under section 2-202, collateral agreements may modify an
underlying contract so long as that underlying contract was not intended to be a “complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.”256 Courts can also look to the parties’ course of dealing
and performance to interpret the underlying contract’s terms.257
The scenario presented above is the conspiratorial equivalent of
a collateral agreement. The parties agreed to illicit resale of seized
drugs. But, as is the case with almost all conspiratorial agreements,
that understanding was necessarily provisional—it was an understanding with no written reduction, and it lacked the requisite completeness and exclusivity that would establish it as fully integrated
and not subject to change via collateral agreement.258 Andy and
Brian’s decision to begin selling stolen firearms would thus appear
to alter that original understanding via a collateral agreement.
Their decision appeared entirely separate from the original conspiratorial agreement; it did not contradict or undermine any of the
provisions of the primary agreement, which was to use Isaac in a
similar way to resell seized drugs for the profit of the group. It concerned matters that Andy, Brian, and Devin would not be expected
to have included in their original agreement, which was formed on
a lark amongst bored, small-town police officers. The course of
dealing between the officers and Isaac, if it extended over a long
251. See 2 WILLISTON , supra note 248, § 637.
252. See id. § 638.
253. See id. § 639.
254. See Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Under the
federal common law’s version of the parol evidence rule, evidence of a collateral agreement
may be admitted if (1) it does not contradict a clear and unambiguous provision of a written
agreement, and (2) the parties did not intend the written agreement to be the complete and
exclusive statement of their agreement.” (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted)).
255. U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2017).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
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period of time, could also demonstrate that such gun-running was
an approved means of business for the conspiracy, even though it
was not part of the original enterprise. Thus, the government could
introduce conversations that furthered those gun-selling transactions against Devin himself.259
D. Guarantees Among Co-Conspirators
Suppose that our crooked cops were not so close at the outset of
their enterprise, and instead knew each other only distantly as
members of the police force. Andy was the first to try absconding
with drugs from crime scenes, and it was his initiative to set up a
meeting with Isaac to discuss acting as a fence. But Isaac did not
know Andy—he only stayed in touch with his former high-school
football teammate Devin. Isaac insisted that he would only work
with Andy if Devin could also guarantee his safety and the future
payments he would receive from the conspiracy. When Andy asks
Devin to vouch for him, Devin does so, but he tells Andy that he also
requires Brian to join their fledgling enterprise.
Andy, eager to start selling drugs, never speaks to Brian and instead lies to Isaac in a recorded conversation, telling him that he
has Brian’s support. He then shares the profits of subsequent drug
sales with both Isaac and Devin. Are Andy’s conversations with
Isaac to facilitate those drug sales admissible against Devin in
court?
The answer, based on the parallel situation concerning other
agreements affecting an instrument under UCC section 3-117, is a
perhaps surprising no.260 The official comment to section 3-117
discusses a situation where a lender will only make a loan to A if D

259. Under the UCC, parties can also include a no modification clause to an agreement to
preclude future evidence of a collateral agreement. U.C.C. § 2-209(2). Co-conspirators may be
able to present evidence that their agreement with co-defendants was unmodifiable, if there
is proof that they created an analogous clause through their words or actions. That said, the
U.C.C. still permits parties to create a waiver of that clause in a future agreement. Id. §§ 2209(2), (4)-(5). Thus, even if the co-conspirators can support their claim that their agreement
cannot be modified—an unlikely scenario in and of itself—the prosecution could respond with
proof that they later explicitly waived that no-modification understanding. See id.
260. See id. § 3-117 official cmt.
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cosigns the note.261 D says he will only cosign if B does too.262 D
cosigns, but A never follows through and obtains B’s signature.263 In
that case, even though D signed the instrument, he is not obligated
under it because of the other agreement he had with the lender that
his co-signature was only valid if accompanied by B’s cosignature.264
In this parallel conspiratorial situation, Devin has signed onto the
conspiracy contingent on Brian also joining. Because Andy did not
follow through and obtain Brian’s assent, Devin’s conditional signing does not obligate him to the conspiracy. Statements made to
further that conspiracy by Andy thus cannot advance Devin’s interests because Devin is not, in reality, a member of that conspiracy,
even though some of the profits may have been distributed to him.
Andy’s statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy should not
be admissible against Devin in court.
V. LIMITATIONS AND LIKELY OBJECTIONS
In this Part, I consider potential limitations of and objections to
both (1) my claim that intuitive judicial thinking creates inconsistent evidentiary rulings and (2) my prescription to promote deliberative cognitive processes through the application of uniform
commercial laws.
A. Fear of the Mechanical Judge
Critics of my approach will likely signal their discomfort with a
model of judicial decision making that cabins judicial discretion.
Given their vast experience, perhaps criminal judges should be able
to rely on their instincts to resolve complex problems rather than
suppressing their gut reactions in favor of a constraining, mechanical checklist.
This critique fails to appreciate the breadth of psychological
research that undergirds behavioral law and economic theory. As
Professor Kahneman noted, “many people are overconfident, prone
to place too much faith in their intuitions” despite mounds of
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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empirical evidence that such thinking is sometimes flawed,
especially in certain situations where feedback is scarce and attention is distracted.265 The same is equally true of judges, as others
have demonstrated by performing many of the same psychological
tests on them that demonstrate the same limitations as seen in the
general public.266 People often disbelieve that they, or the average
well-meaning judge, would be subject to these same cognitive limitations. But such disbelief is not a valid option in the face of decades
of psychological research.267 Instead, we must address the cognitive
limitations all of us—even judges—face in order to improve the
consistency of our legal system.
Such objections are common whenever flaws in our cognitive
processes are applied to a new field of expertise.268 For instance,
when Dr. Atul Gawande first suggested the use of surgical safety
checklists to reduce error caused by intuitive cognitive thinking,
most of the professionals initially studied were extremely skeptical.269 A sizable minority—roughly 20 percent of those studied—maintained that skepticism even at the end of the study.270 But
when asked whether they would want their own doctors to use the
checklists after learning that the implementation of checklists had
reduced major complications by 36 percent and deaths by 47
percent, a full 93 percent of those professionals said yes.271
It is also noteworthy that the application of uniform commercial
laws will not require judges to become machines that apply rote
rules in every situation. My proposal is simply for judges to consider
a few possible parallels between commercial organizations and illicit
ones, and, if appropriate, apply rule-based uniform commercial laws
to solve difficult problems. That exercise still requires a great deal
of judicial reasoning—it is, after all, a method to engage judges’
more thorough, System 2 deliberative cognitive pathways.272 This
265. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 45-46, 241.
266. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 2-5.
267. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 57 (“[D]isbelief is not an option. The results are not made
up, nor are they statistical flukes. You have no choice but to accept that the major conclusions
of these studies are true. More important, you must accept that they are true about you.”).
268. See id. at 242.
269. See GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 153-57.
270. See id. at 157.
271. Id. at 154, 157.
272. See KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 20-22.
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proposal does not aim to turn judges into machines, but rather seeks
to create more thoughtful jurists.
B. The Limited Applicability of Uniform Commercial Laws
Others may question how broadly uniform commercial laws can
apply to conspiracies. Aside from a few cherry-picked examples, the
parallels between licit and illicit profit-motivated organizations may
be scarce, and hence the utility of applying checklist-style solutions
to co-conspirator hearsay questions may be limited.
There is some resonance to this critique. Though I have presented
several examples of the applicability of uniform commercial laws in
this Article, the scope of their applicability is still unclear. Uniform
commercial laws may well only apply to a few particular situations.
But even if the crossover between uniform commercial laws and conspiratorial organizations is somewhat limited, my approach still has
significant utility. Research on the use of checklists as a guide to
complex cognitive tasks for professionals suggests that they are only
effective when limited to a few particularly salient items.273
Furthermore, this critique does not undermine the core of my
position that uniform commercial laws that allocate loss and responsibility amongst the parties to a licit for-profit organization can give
guidance to criminal courts allocating responsibility among the parties to an illicit for-profit organization. The parallels between these
organizations are real, and the legal approaches to them ought to be
similar, even if only in a limited number of specific scenarios.274
C. The Complexity of Uniform Commercial Laws
Another likely objection stems from the inherent complexity of
uniform commercial laws. These are intricate, likely unfamiliar
rules for criminal judges working in the rapid-fire world of pretrial
273. See GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 120 (“Good checklists ... are precise. They are
efficient, to the point, and easy to use even in the most difficult situations. They do not try to
spell out everything—a checklist cannot fly a plane. Instead, they provide reminders of only
the most critical and important steps—the ones that even the highly skilled professionals
using them could miss. Good checklists are, above all, practical .... They can help experts
remember how to manage a complex process or configure a complex machine.”).
274. See supra Parts III.B-C.
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motion practice. Reliance on them simply piles an added layer of
complexity atop an already complex decision-making process, the
objection goes, and risks stoppering the criminal justice system.
First, this objection takes a rather dim view of the capabilities of
criminal judges. Certainly they too can internalize uniform commercial laws, at least as well as law students who rely on checklists and
decision trees to resolve exam questions.275 And those checklists
themselves will be crucial to avoid unnecessary delay.276 The lists
themselves will not be too complex, or else judges will cast them
aside and refuse to implement them in their decision-making
processes.277 As discussed above, the key to creating a useful checklist is to distill information to just a few key, salient points that the
user should review—in my model, questions such as “is this alleged
statement by a co-conspirator similar to a transaction unauthorized
by a former partner?”278 Generating the lists would certainly take
time, and the adoption of them might likewise be a lengthy process.
But they present an opportunity, over time, to improve consistency
and accuracy in pretrial evidentiary rulings.279
Second, the complexity of uniform commercial laws is actually a
useful feature. That complexity is likely to engage criminal judges’
deliberative cognitive processes.280 The application of uniform commercial laws should nudge judges toward more deliberative
thinking and away from intuitive rulings.281 The cognitive strain
necessary to apply uniform commercial laws will help engage those
deliberative cognitive pathways.282 The aim is to combine both the
cognitive strain that application requires with the ready solutions
available in the form of checklists and decision trees to yield more
consistent, but still relatively quick, answers to pretrial evidentiary
questions.
275. See, e.g., CONVISER, supra note 184, at 136; WHALEY, supra note 184, at 25.
276. See GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 156-57.
277. See id. at 120.
278. See supra Part III.C.
279. See supra Parts II.C-III.
280. See supra Part III.C.
281. See supra Part III.C.
282. KAHNEMAN , supra note 7, at 65 (“Cognitive strain, whatever its source, mobilizes
System 2, which is more likely to reject the intuitive answer suggested by System 1.”); see also
GAWANDE, supra note 18, at 79 (“[U]nder conditions of complexity, not only are checklists a
help, they are required for success. There must always be room for judgment, but judgment
aided—and even enhanced—by procedure.”).
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CONCLUSION
Faced with crowded dockets that require myriad rulings on a
daily basis, criminal judges behave just as any overwhelmed person
would: they turn to intuitive cognitive processes to resolve otherwise
complex evidentiary issues.283 And just as behavioral law and economic theory would predict, that perfectly natural reliance upon intuition creates inconsistency and inaccuracy in the jurisprudence on
complex evidentiary rules such as the co-conspirator exception to
hearsay.284 In turn, the scope of evidentiary exceptions that almost
always disfavor defendants grows unchecked.285
Fortunately, we can give criminal judges a useful nudge towards
deliberative cognitive processes. Law and behavioral economic theory suggests that checklist-style thinking can engage deliberative,
System 2 thinking among the judiciary, reducing the prevalence of
cognitive error inimical to System 1 intuitive judgments. If judges
look to principles of uniform commercial laws and rely on the decision trees and checklists those disciplines provide, then they can
engage their deliberative faculties while still generating decisions
relatively quickly with far more consistent results. Given the close
parallels between illicit and licit profit-motivated organizations, the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is one area ripe for such
application of uniform commercial law. By applying such laws,
judges can thus reduce error on crucial evidentiary questions that
are a frequent source of wrongful convictions.

283. See Guthrie et al., supra note 9, at 35.
284. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

